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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1930s and 1940s, it was an article of faith that the National
Labor Relations Act ("the Act" or "the NLRA") and the National Labor
Relations Board ("the Board" or "the NLRB")-the federal statute and
agency governing union organizing-were a tremendous boon to the labor
movement.' Statistics bore out the intuition. Union membership exploded
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1. Although this view was widely held at the time, it was not universal. See "WE ARE
ALL LEADERS": THE ALTERNATIVE UNIONISM OF THE EARLY 1930s 8-10 (Staughton Lynd
ed., University of Illinois Press 1996) (quoting union, civil rights, and other leaders at the
time of the passage of the NLRA, who expressed the concern that the Act would become an
impediment to labor organization and union success). Today there are many more dissenters
from the view that the NLRA itself was a gift to labor. See Staughton Lynd, Government
Without Rights: The Labor Law Vision ofArchibald Cox, 4 INDuS. REL. L.J. 483, n.2 (1981)
(questioning the proposition that the Wagner Act led to the rise of organized labor in the
1930s); James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment versus the Commerce Clause: Labor
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from four million workers in 1936, the year after the NLRA's passage, to
fourteen million a decade later, representing over 35% of the private
workforce.2 Yet today, and for at least the past two decades, it has equally
become labor's credo that the NLRB and the NLRA (as amended by
Congress and interpreted by the NLRB and the federal judiciary) are
massive impediments to unionization.3 Again, numbers tell a stark story.
While unions currently count 15.8 million workers as members,4 this
represents less than 8% of the private workforce, a dramatic decline. And
80% of the three million people who became union members between 1998
and 2003 did so outside of the NLRB-supervised election process.5
What does law offer labor? It depends. The specifics of the law in
question are critical, as are the make-up and funding of the agency that is
charged with implementing it and the economic strength, political clout,
and strategic creativity of the unions and employers that it governs.
Today's discussions of the NLRA from the union perspective are tinged
with desperation about what law does for and to organizing-a desperation
that is born of labor's sense that it has lost too many important battles
before the NLRB and the courts over the interpretation of the NLRA. In
despair, however, workers and their institutions risk losing sight of
critically valuable lessons that emerge from a long view of the labor
movement about the varied ways that law can interact with collective
efforts to improve working conditions. This Article seeks to draw out some
of those insights, both through a brief overview of the changing
and the Shaping ofAmerican Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2002)
(arguing that the Wagner Act's roots in the Commerce Clause worked to the detriment of
labor). Other scholars of labor law have argued that the problem lay not so much with the
NLRA as with its subsequent interpretation by the courts. See Karl E. Klare, Judicial
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 193 7-
1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 268-69 (1978); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War
Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509, 1511 (1981).
2. ARCHIBALD Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY (1960).
3. For scholarly arguments to this effect, see JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE
SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR RELATIONS POLICY, 1947-1994 (1995); PAUL C. WEILER,
GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990);
RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW (Sheldon Friedman, et al. eds., 1994);
Deborah A. Ballam, The Law as a Constitutive Force for Change, Part I" The Impact of
the National Labor Relations Act on the U.S. Labor Movement 32 AM. Bus. L.J. 447 (1995);
Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1527,
1569 (2002); Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for
Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59 (1993); Keith N. Hylton, Law and the
Future of Organized Labor in America, 49 WAYNE L. REV. 685 (2003); James Gray Pope,
How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518
(2004).
4. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 2004-2005 (124th ed. 2004).
5. James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects
for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REv. 819, 828 (2005).
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relationship between the labor movement, law, and lawyers during the
twentieth century, and, more deeply, through an exploration of fifteen years
in the specific experience of one union, the United Farm Workers ("the
UFW"), whose history, while unique in many regards, recapitulates and
sharpens the points of the larger story.
The percentage of workers organized by unions has been in a slow-
motion freefall for decades. The challenges labor faces are complex. The
structure of the economy has changed dramatically over the past fifty years:
employers have moved the union bulwark of full-time manufacturing jobs
overseas, and service industries now make up the majority of the economy.
Work itself is often configured differently, with part-time, temporary, and
subcontracted arrangements increasingly substituting for direct employ-
ment. All of this is complicated by the AFL-CIO's long period of ossifi-
cation during the second half of the twentieth century. Among the many
culprits, however, "The Law"-more precisely, the NLRA and its
administration by the NLRB and by federal courts-is among the most
frequently fingered for this state of decline. Commentators converge on
the assessment that a labor law once written to facilitate collective
bargaining in this country has come to impede it.
6
From a union perspective, one problem is the law's obsolescence. The
National Labor Relations Act, initiated by the Wagner Act in 1935 and
amended only twice since, by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 and then by the
Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959, languished without congressional attention
during the ensuing half-century as the economy exploded around it. The
Act reflects dated assumptions about work and the structure of the
economy. In a setting in which indirect employment-subcontracting,
independent contracting, and temporary work-is ever more common, the
NLRA's protections cover only direct employees. 7  In a low-wage
economy characterized by large-scale undocumented immigration, the
Supreme Court has recently stated that employers who fire undocumented
6. See sources cited supra note 3.
7. Prior to its legislative overruling in the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, the ruling case had
been NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944), which stated a much broader
standard for coverage of direct and indirect workers. On the changing structure of work, see
KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE
CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004); Craig Becker, Labor Law Outside the Employment
Relation, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1527 (1996); Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of
Workplace Regulation: A Historical and Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 24
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153 (2003); Jennifer Middleton, Contingent Workers in a
Changing Economy: Endure, Adapt, or Organize?, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 557
(1996).
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workers in retaliation for their union support may be free from any threat of
monetary penalty for violating the NLRA. s In a globalized world, where
workers in the United States compete for jobs with those in China,
Vietnam, and Honduras, the NLRA is wholly domestic in its reach.9
Unions today struggle to organize under a labor law written for another
time.
In another sense, though, the law has changed not too little but too
much. When passed in 1935, the Wagner Act represented a clear
proclamation of a government policy in favor of union organizing. At the
end of World War II, the Supreme Court could still state with confidence
that the NLRA "sought to ... bring industrial peace by substituting ... the
rights of workers to self-organization and collective bargaining for the
industrial strife which prevails where these rights are not effectively
established."' But the NLRA was amended with the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act in 1947, which imposed a range of restrictions on union
activity, including a bar on strikes demanding recognition,"' and a bar on
the crucial weapon of secondary pressure. 12  The Taft-Hartley Act also
created a series of new unfair labor practices for which unions could be
punished.' 3  It prohibited "closed shop" agreements 14 and opened the door
8. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151 (2001).
9. See Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (stating presumption that laws
passed by Congress do not extend beyond U.S. territory); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,
499 U.S. 244, 248, 251-52 (1991) (citing McColluch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963)) (finding that a reference to foreign commerce in definition
of law's coverage of "commerce" is insufficient to rebut presumption against extra-
territorial jurisdiction); Computer Sci. Raytheon, 318 N.L.R.B. 966, 968 (1995) (affirming
that the NLRA does not apply extraterritorially). For a critique of this and of the application
of the NLRA plant-closing doctrine in a globalized work context, see Terry Collingsworth,
Resurrecting the National Labor Relations Act-Plant Closings and Runaway Shops in a
Global Economy, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 72 (1993).
10. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 125.
11. Taft-Hartley banned most forms of recognitional picketing. National Labor
Relations Act § 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2005). A showing of support from a majority of
the workers is required before an employer is required to recognize and bargain with a
union. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596 (1969).
12. "Secondary pressure" refers to the union practice--common until barred by Taft-
Hartley (National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2005))-of calling for a
boycott of an enterprise doing business with an employer with whom the union has a dispute
(such as a store carrying products made by a manufacturer against whom the union is on
strike), and of asking other unions as well as consumers to respect that boycott.
13. Taft-Hartley made most of the employer unfair labor practices set out in the Wagner
Act into union unfair labor practices as well. For example, as a parallel to National Labor
Relations Act § 8(a)(1), which prohibits employer interference with employees' exercise of
the organizing rights guaranteed by § 7 of the Act, Taft-Hartley created § 8(b)(1), which
prohibits similar actions by unions. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (2005). It also render illegal a
range of practices unique to unions, and announced new remedies where a union violated
the law. Section 7 itself was amended by Taft-Hartley to protect employees who refrained
from supporting a labor organization as well as those who supported one. 29 U.S.C. § 157
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for states to pass laws prohibiting mandatory union membership 15-an
invitation promptly taken up by a number of Southern states.
Twenty-five years after the passage of Taft-Hartley, the Supreme
Court offered quite a different characterization of the NLRA: "The
congressional policy manifest in the Act is to enable the parties to negotiate
for any protection either deems appropriate, but to allow the balance of
bargaining advantage to be set by economic power realities."' 6  Power
realities in the labor context being what they are, it is not surprising that the
outcome has been less than favorable from a union perspective. 17  Post-
Taft-Hartley, the NLRA's once protective stance toward collective
bargaining was steadily eroded by more than fifty years of NLRB and court
decisions restricting worker and union rights, and by stepped-up employer
resistance in a context of devastating administrative delays and inadequate
incentives for employers to obey the law.'" From rules that permit
(2005).
14. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158. A "closed shop" is one in
which an employer may not employ any workers who are not already union members.
There is a limited exception for pre-hire agreements in the construction industry. NLRA §
8(f), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2000). In non-"Right to Work" states (see infra note 15), however,
unions are still permitted to negotiate union security clauses which require all employees to
pay union dues, so long as they do not mandate full membership in the union. Such
arrangements are also referred to as "agency shop" or "union shop" agreements.
15. National Labor Relations Act § 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164 (2005). So-called "Right to
Work" laws, currently on the books in twenty-three states, outlaw union security clauses.
U.S. Dep't of Labor, State Right-to-Work Laws and Constitutional Amendments in Effect
as of January 1, 2005 With Year of Passage, http://www.dol.gov/esa/programs/whd/state/
righttowork.htm. In these states, workers hired to work in a unionized shop do not have to
join the union or pay dues. The result has been an extremely low level of unionization in
such states, and a high burden on those unions that do succeed, as an incumbent union has a
duty to represent all workers in the bargaining unit fully whether or not they pay dues. Id.
16. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 288 (1972). AFL-CIO General
Counsel Jonathan Hiatt points out that Taft-Hartley left untouched the Wagner Act's
introductory sections, in which Congress set out its belief in the importance of collective
bargaining to avoid industrial strife and ensure the country's economic wellbeing.
Telephone Interview with Jonathan Hiatt, General Counsel Jonathan Hiatt, AFL-CIO (Mar.
22, 2005). While these sections continue to provide advocates with rhetorical resources (for
an elaboration of this argument, see Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American
Values (unpublished paper presented at the Law & Society Ass'n Annual Conference in
June 2005, on file with Journal)), courts have shown little inclination to take guidance from
them in uprooting restrictive post-Taft-Hartley interpretations of the NLRA.
17. On those power realities, see Stone, supra note 1.
18. See sources cited supra note 3. On employer resistance, see Kate L. Bronfenbren-
ner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and First-Contract Campaigns:
Implications for Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW,
supra note 3, at 75-89. The NLRB is made up of political appointees, and its policies often
track their politics. The result has sometimes been a cycling back and forth between pro-
and anti-labor positions on the same issue although the overall trajectory has been toward
limiting workers' and organized labor's rights. In the most recent manifestation of this
trend, the George W. Bush board issued several harmful to unions decisions in the summer
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employers to carry out extensive anti-union campaigns, to the lack of any
meaningful monetary remedies for workers dismissed in retaliation for
organizing, to multi-year waits before a court orders a fired worker
reinstated, labor law has become an albatross around labor's neck. 9  In
1984 AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland famously quipped that the NLRA
had become so bad for unions that they would be "better off with the law of
the jungle., 20 Reflecting this state of affairs, many unions today do their
best to organize new workers without using NLRA-established procedures.
Clearly, if unions are to re-emerge as a force to be reckoned with in
the United States, much more than the law will have to be transformed.
Recent shifts within the labor movement itself reflect the pressure to
change. In the fall of 2003, a group of powerful unions, led by the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU) and what is now UNITE-HERE,
the merged garment and hotel/restaurant workers unions, challenged the
AFL-CIO to think more strategically in terms of its approach to organizing,
the industries represented by its member unions, and the scale of the
collective bargaining agreements it sought.2 Unsatisfied with the response,
SEIU withdrew from the AFL-CIO on the eve of its annual convention in
July 2005. It was joined by the Teamsters. UNITE-HERE and the United
Food and Commercial Workers soon followed, and these four unions
together with several others launched the Change to Win Coalition on
September 27, 2005.22 For the first time since the CIO split off from the
of 2004. It denied non-union workers the right to have a representative present at a
disciplinary proceeding in IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1, 2 (2004), a right recently promised
to them by the Clinton board in Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B 676 (2000). In a
case involving a unionization drive by graduate students at Brown University, Brown Univ.,
342 N.L.R.B. 1 (2004), it ruled that graduate students are more like students than workers
and thus have no right to organize, reversing the Clinton board's opposite determination in a
case about NYU's graduate students, New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B 1205 (2000). And it has
granted review in two cases that raise the question of whether union representation obtained
by presenting cards signed by a majority of workers carries the same protection from
decertification as representation obtained by election. See NLRB Press Release, Labor
Board Grants Review and Invites Briefs to Be Filed in Two Cases Involving Neutrality
Agreements (June 15, 2004), http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/press/releases/r2528.htm.
19. On delays in NLRB proceedings, see GROSS, supra note 3; WEILER, supra note 3.
20. Cathy Trost & Leonard M. Apcar, AFL-CIO Chief Calls Labor Laws a "Dead
Letter", WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1984, at A8.
21. The group called itself the "New Unity Partnership" ("NUP"). For the platform put
forth by the SEIU, see "Unite to Win: A 21st Century Plan to Build New Strength for
Working People," http://www.labornotes.org/nupdiscussion/seiu.pdf. NUP officially dis-
banded in January 2005. Harold Meyerson, "Time's Up for the NUP," American Prospect
Online, January 18, 2005, http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=
ViewWeb&articleld=9054.
22. Steven Greenhouse, "4th Union Quits A.F.L.-C.I.O. In a Dispute Over Organizing,"
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at A14; Steven Greenhouse, "Breakaway Unions Start New
Federation," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2005, at A17. Other Change to Win Coalition members
unions are the Laborers International Union of North America, the United Farm Workers,
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AFL in 1935, the United States has two national organizations of labor
unions instead of one.
But it is also true that the time has come for a change in the
relationship between the law and the labor movement. The call for such a
change usually means: reshape the NLRB and reform the NLRA. From a
labor perspective, the Board's funding and power surely need to be
augmented and the Act needs to be rewritten.23 But in the current political
atmosphere, the idea that Congress will make meaningful pro-labor
changes in the NLRA or the NLRB is no more than a fantasy. Recognizing
this, others have called for reform strategies that focus on new approaches
to litigating labor cases, 24 or on arguing labor's case in the court of public
21opinion.
In this Article, I argue for a much broader understanding of the
potential synergy between law and labor organizing, and of what lawyers
can offer labor. Labor lawyers for unions have received very little
scholarly attention of late. When they are discussed, it tends to be in the
same leaden tones of despair that are commonly applied to the labor
movement as a whole. The implication is that they are mired hopelessly in
the glue of the NLRA, toiling to defend organizing efforts that are likely
doomed to failure in any case. While labor attorneys do continue to defend
union organizing under the NLRA, the past ten years have seen the
flourishing of renewed experimentation with what lawyers and legal
strategies offer unions outside the confines of settled labor law, as well as
the consideration anew of legislative change.
What labor lawyers can do for organizing is, of course, a question of
considerable import to the AFL-CIO and the Change to Win Coalition, in
particular to their lawyers, who have been grappling with possible answers
through their work in local, state and federal forums all over the country. I
will describe these efforts-and other creative labor movement lawyering,
both historically and today-later in this Article.
This Article, however, is rooted in a different moment in the history of
the labor movement, a moment that has been much celebrated as an
and the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of North America. Change to Win
Website, http://www.changetowin.org.
23. The AFL-CIO strongly supports a labor law reform bill currently pending before
Congress, the Employee Free Choice Act of 2005, S.842, 109th (2005). See Part IV infra.
24. Dannin, supra note 16.
25. See Stewart Acuff, "Fighting for Unions," THE NATION, April 18, 2005, at 5-6
("The whole community needs to be aware of employer interference in organizing, leading
to a groundswell of moral outrage that inspires people to agitate and disrupt business as
usual."). Acuff is the AFL-CIO's Director of Organizing and runs the federation's
Voice@Work program, which seeks to educate the public about the importance and
imperiled nature of the right to organize in the workplace. Voice@Work Homepage,
http://www.aflcio.org/joinaunion/voiceatwork/.
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organizing triumph among "unorganizable" workers: the struggle of Cesar
Chavez and the United Farm Workers during the 1960s and 1970s to win
contracts for farm workers in the ranches and fields of California and other
agricultural states. These workers were then and remain now some of the
poorest and most disenfranchised laborers in the country's history. They
are explicitly excluded from the protections of the NLRA, like so many
others in fact or in practice today. 6 Many are aware of the basic outlines of
the UFW story. Few realize that lawyers and a powerful combination of
legal and organizing strategies played important roles in the United Farm
Workers' victories.
In Part II of the Article, I describe the UFW's use of legal strategies in
support of its organizing goals during the early period in which it was not
governed by any organizing statute. Drawing on my original research,
including interviews with the UFW's then-General Counsel and numerous
other former lead UFW organizers and lawyers, I begin by analyzing the
intertwining of law and organizing in the history of the UFW. The UFW
used the fact that farm workers are statutorily excluded from the NLRA to
its advantage for more than a decade. However, the lack of a state-
administered framework for organizing also hampered the union's efforts
to institutionalize its victories.
I then turn to the Union's eventual successful pursuit of the
Agricultural Labor Relations Act ("the ALRA") in California. In pushing
for the ALRA, the UFW was able to craft a law with provisions that
surpass what the NLRA offered even at its inception: in the words of one
of its architects, the ALRA is "the best labor law in America. 27
The ALRA provided the UFW with a set of tools that it used for
several years to great effect in order to bring tens of thousands of farm
workers into the union. The UFW story is particularly poignant in this
regard, as within less than a decade after the ALRA's passage, the Union
was in a shambles. Many factors contributed to the UFW's decline in the
1980s, and it was, above all, the Union's weakened state that eventually
rendered it incapable of taking advantage of what the law had to offer. But
an analysis of the UFW's interactions with the law also offers some insight
into the obstacles a statutory framework can create even as it offers a tool
to a union poised to take advantage of its provisions.
In Part III, I analyze the UFW's legal department as an example of
social justice lawyering that offers concrete lessons not only for the labor
movement but also for other organizing efforts today. For all the change
26. "The term 'employee' ... shall not include any individual employed as an
agricultural laborer ...." National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2005).
Others excluded include supervisors, domestic workers, and public employees.
27. Jerome Cohen, UFW Must Get Back to Organizing: Despite Opposition, Farm-
Labor Law Is Still a Potent Weapon, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1986, at Metro Part I1, 5.
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that the UFW experienced when the legal framework for its organizing
shifted dramatically with the passage of the ALRA, the question UFW
lawyers asked remained a constant: what can law and legal strategies do
to build power for this movement at this moment? The UFW's ability to
focus exclusively on that inquiry and to experiment-often at high risk-
with creative answers was critical to its success. I argue that this capacity,
and the Union's avoidance of the "lawyer domination" that scholars and
activists often note in lawyer/organizer collaborations, is traceable to the
the Union's breadth and strength at the time that it brought lawyers onto its
staff, its leaders' recognition of the power of law and the mutual respect
among lawyers and organizers that this engendered, and the in-house
structure of the legal department, among other factors.
In Part IV, I turn to a brief history of the use of law within the
mainstream labor movement, noting the many parallels with the UFW's
experience. I trace the flow from the free-form, multi-level legal strategy
that characterized the pre-NLRA period, to a labor-lawyer-as-technician
model in the middle decades of the last century, to the current resurgence
of innovative lawyering as a part of the concerted effort by the labor
movement to escape the confines of an ossified labor law, and most
recently, to the turn toward the pursuit of a new bill that would bring these
new strategies under the NLRA framework.
In Part V, I draw on my examination of the UFW's use of law over the
trajectory of its early history and on other examples of labor lawyering,
both in the 1930s and 1940s and today, to suggest a framework for
understanding what union lawyers are already doing and what they might
do further to support the emergence of a rejuvenated labor movement. I
focus in particular on the cyclical push-pull between the attractions of
lawyering and organizing outside of a governing framework and on the
powerful urge to enshrine the right to organize in law, evident in the
experience of the UFW and recurring again in the AFL-CIO's work today.
Throughout, my argument is this: used thoughtfully (and often unconven-
tionally), with full awareness of its pitfalls, law can play an important
supporting role in the rebirth of a movement, both in the workplace and
beyond.
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II. THE UNITED FARM WORKERS' USE OF LAW, 1962-198028
The United Farm Workers combined a labor organization for the
country's most disenfranchised workers with a mass movement attracting
broad support across the continent and beyond. 9 When the UFW was
founded in 1962 by Cesar Chavez and fellow Mexican-American
community activists in Delano, California, wages on California's large
corporate ranches were pitifully low. The UFW's chief opponent was
California agribusiness. By the 1960s, agriculture in California had left the
small family farm in the dust. From the UFW's birthplace in the southern
San Joaquin Valley, large corporate growers whose ranches measured from
10,000 to over 100,000 acres supplied grapes, vegetables, and strawberries
to the entire country. 30 Although mechanization was encroaching on work
traditionally done by hand, fields were still primarily tilled, planted, and
picked by Mexican-Americans, Mexican braceros, migrants from the
Philippines as well as other countries, and undocumented immigrants.
Wages were pitifully low. Working conditions were inhumane, from the
lack of toilets and drinking water in the fields, to the widespread use of "el
cortito," the short-handled hoe that required workers to bend at back-
breaking angles for hours at a time, to the pesticide residues that hung in
the air and clung to leaves, poisoning workers as they labored. When
workers protested these abuses, growers had a panoply of tools at their
disposal to silence dissent. In the 1950s, from a third to a half of the
workers they hired were braceros, whose legal status was conditioned on
maintaining their job; uncounted others were illegally present.3' A quick
dismissal or call to the INS could derail many organizing efforts. Where
the workers involved were legal permanent residents or citizens, the sheriff
28. The UFW continues organizing farm workers today, more than a decade after Cesar
Chavez's death, under the leadership of Arturo Rodriguez, Chavez's son-in-law. I focus on
the period from 1962 to 1980 because it encompasses the height of the Union's legal
creativity, the peak of its farm worker representation, and the period of greatest public
attention to and involvement with the Union's work.
29. The UFW changed its name several times after its founding in 1962. It began as the
Farm Workers Association (FWA), a designation chosen deliberately to avoid many farm
workers' negative connotations with the word "union." In 1964 it added "National" before
its name (NFWA). In 1966, when the Union merged with the AFL-CIO sponsored
Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee, it became the United Farm Workers
Organizing Committee (UFWOC). Finally, in 1972 when UFWOC formally affiliated with
the AFL-CIO as a full member, it took the United Farm Workers of America (UFW) as its
name. Marshall Ganz, Resources and Resourcefulness: Strategic Capacity in the
Unionization of California Agriculture, 1959-1966, 105 AM. J. Soc. 1003, n.2 (2000)
[hereinafter Ganz, Resources and Resourcefulness]. To avoid confusion, I use "UFW"
throughout.
30. RONALD B. TAYLOR, CHAVEZ AND THE FARM WORKERS 38-39 (1975).
31. LINDA C. MAJKA & THEO J. MAJKA, FARM WORKERS, AGRIBUSINESS AND THE STATE
153 (1982).
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or local police could often be relied upon to quell dissent. Farm workers
were unprotected by basic national wage and labor laws such as the Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the National Labor Relations Act, and
growers had cultivated political allies to ensure that no new laws were
passed.
As decades of sporadically successful strikes had shown, farm
workers were not completely without power. But until the UFW, no farm
worker organizing effort had been able to create an organization of farm
workers with the creativity, persistence, and stability to fight for on-going
union representation and win, much less to negotiate multi-faceted con-
tracts and administer them over several seasons.32
Chavez knew that a stable worker organization was necessary to
overcome the problem of fleeting victories that other organizing efforts had
faced, and he was committed to years of base-building before the union
launched its first campaign. To draw farm workers into the effort, the
UFW offered a range of services and co-operatives, a response both to the
breadth of farm workers' needs and to Chavez's philosophy that a union
ought to do more for its members than negotiate and administer contracts.33
Even with broad support, Chavez realized that the battle to win contracts
might be long. But as a farm worker himself and a longtime organizer, he
also recognized that farm workers had as-yet untapped sources of power.
32. For journalistic overviews of the UFW's history, see TAYLOR, supra note 30; SUSAN
FERRISS & RICARDO SANDOVAL, THE FIGHT IN THE FIELDS: CESAR CHAVEZ AND THE
FARMWORKERS MOVEMENT (Diana Hembree ed., 1997). For an oral history of the
movement's first years, see JACQUES E. LEVY, CESAR CHAVEZ: AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LA
CAUSA (1975). For scholarly analyses of the Union's strategy, successes and failures, see
MARSHALL GANZ, FIVE SMOOTH STONES: STRATEGY, LEADERSHIP, AND THE CALIFORNIA
AGRICULTURAL MOVEMENT (forthcoming June 2006); PHILIP L. MARTIN, PROMISES TO KEEP:
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE (1996); Theo J. Majka & Linda C.
Majka, Power, Insurgency and State Intervention: Farm Labor Movements in California, in
6 RESEARCH IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, CONFLICTS AND CHANGE 195 (Richard E. Ratcliff &
Louis Kriesberg, eds., 1984) [hereinafter Majka & Majka, Power, Insurgency and State
Intervention]; Miriam J. Wells & Don Villarejo, State Structures and Social Movement
Strategies: The Shaping of Farm Labor Protections in California 32 POL. & Soc'Y 291
(2004); Ganz, Resources and Resourcefulness, supra note 29.
33. Among other co-operative ventures, the Union sponsored a credit union co-op, a co-
operative gas station and a repair shop. LeRoy Chatfield, who worked for the Union in a
variety of capacities (including Chief Administrative Officer) from 1965 to 1973, notes that
the existence of these co-ops was very important to Chavez, and that they were attractive to
workers, but that they were often not successful as businesses. "Some were disasters; some
worked and some half-worked .... The books did not square. Loans weren't repaid."
Interview with LeRoy Chatfield, Former Chief Administrative Officer, UFW, in
Sacramento, Cal. (Feb. 27, 2000) [hereinafter Chatfield Interview]. With the humor of
hindsight, lead organizer Gilbert Padilla recalls the frequency with which angry workers
would return to the co-operative mechanic shop when a problem "repaired" the day before
had recurred as soon as the car hit the road. Interview with Gilbert Padilla, former Lead
Organizer, UFW, in Las Vegas, Nev. (Feb. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Padilla Interview].
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There was a stable Chicano community in some places, and it was in this
community (as opposed to, say, among day laborers, as a previous AFL-
CIO farm labor organizing campaign had attempted)34 that UFW built its
base. The majority of the workforce was Mexican or Chicano and shared a
religious and cultural identity. Drawing on this identity, the UFW's
integration of prayer, religious services, and traditional Mexican symbols
such as the Virgin of Guadalupe, with Gandhian tactics such as the fast,
created a culture and a spirit of determination that kept the Union going
despite repeated defeats.35
The UFW developed its unique organizing strategy in response to the
particular circumstances of farm labor. In the face of the never-ending
influx of new workers too mobile and too desperate to be effectively
organized to stay out of work for long, traditional union organizing
measures such as strikes and pickets were very hard to sustain. A union
could not physically stop the flow of labor into the fields for long because
the space was so vast and because courts restricted pickets to impossibly
small numbers. And, as migrant workers were well aware, if they
demanded union representation they could easily be replaced by temporary
workers hauled up from Mexico; by undocumented workers, present in
growing numbers; and by workers bused in from other parts of the country.
Despite these obstacles, the collective action of farm workers was
important to the UFW's strategy. In some industries, particularly on
vegetable ranches, where the workers tended to be more militant young
single men rather than the families that migrated to pick grapes, the Union
carried out successful campaigns wholly based on worker organizing and
strikes. Even where workers were unable to sustain direct pressure for
long, the UFW continued to wrest all of the leverage it could from the
perishable nature of the crops that its members harvested by cutting off the
labor supply at key moments, beginning with its first strike in 1965.
Given the difficulty of winning contracts for mobile, replaceable farm
workers through strikes, the UFW also sought to create a social climate in
which the existing treatment of farm workers was seen as unjust. The
UFW used that climate to generate moral, economic, and political pressure
on growers to recognize the UFW as the legitimate representative of farm
workers. To supplement and at times replace field organizing, the Union
called on middle-class consumers around the country to boycott non-Union
fruits and vegetables. This served as an effective year-round economic
weapon that worked in complementary ways with the Union's on-the-
ground organizing, particularly between 1965 and 1970 (the first grape
34. MARTIN, supra note 32, at 85.
35. See e.g., Ganz, Resources & Resourcefulness, supra note 29, at 1031, 1034, 1036,
1039 (providing examples of Mexican religious symbols and practices adapted by the
UFW).
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boycott) and at various times during the 1970s and 1980s (boycotts of other
produce and wine as well as grapes). The combination of union and social
movement strategies proved successful for the UFW in its early days. By
early 1973, the Union could boast an unprecedented 150 contracts with
California growers, covering 50,000 workers.36
A. The United Farm Workers'Early Legal Strategy
Although the general outline of the UFW's story is well known, the
role of lawyers in that story has remained nearly unexplored in published
sources.37 Yet the creative use of law played an important role in the
Union's success. At its peak, the UFW legal department had seventeen
lawyers and forty-four paralegals, high numbers indeed in the context of a
leanly-staffed and financially-struggling movement.
In the Union's first years, it parceled out its legal work to volunteer
lawyers and outside counsel. The volunteers, mostly recent law graduates,
largely counseled and represented farm workers on individual matters."
Chavez also experimented with hiring a staff lawyer whose principal
responsibility was to provide members with services. He became
overwhelmed by the volume of work and only lasted for a brief period.39
36. FERRISS & SANDOVAL, supra note 36 at 188; MAJKA & MAJKA, supra note 31, at
223.
37. A few of the books and articles about the UFW touch briefly on this aspect of the
Union's work. See e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 30; LEVY, supra note 32; MAJKA AND MAJKA,
supra note 31. See also MARLISE JAMES, THE PEOPLE'S LAWYERS 324 (1973) (Chapter 20,
entitled "Jerome Cohen, Attorney, the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee").
There are no comprehensive treatments of the Union's legal strategy. (There are, however,
several articles on the ALRA that are also about the UFW's use of that law. See e.g., Wells
& Villarejo, supra note 32). This Article and my other work on the topic are therefore
based on original research, including interviews with CRLA founding attorneys James
Lorenz and Gary Bellow; former UFW General Counsel Jerry Cohen; former UFW staff
attorneys Bill Carder, Tom Dalzell, Ira "Buddy" Gottlieb, Ellen Greenstone (also a former
staff attorney at the ALRB), Peter Haberfeld, Sandy Nathan, and Barbara Rhine; former
UFW volunteer attorney Howard Richards; former UFW Executive Committee members
and organizers Marshall Ganz, Jessica Govea, Eliseo Medina, and Gilbert Padilla; and
former UFW Chief Administrative Officer and Service Center Director LeRoy Chatfield.
All quotes in this article are from these interviews unless otherwise attributed, and all
references to "interview" refer to interviews carried out by the author unless otherwise
indicated. I am also very grateful for access to the Jacques E. Levy Research Collection on
Cesar Chavez, held in the Beinecke Library at Yale, and for the primary materials collected
by LeRoy Chatfield through the Farmworker Movement Documentation Project, now
available online at http://www.farmworkermovement.org/.
38. Howard Richards, the Union's first volunteer lawyer, also helped the Union protect
its funds from grower lawsuits. Telephone Interview with Howard Richards, Former
Volunteer Attorney, UFW (June 28, 2004) [hereinafter Richards Interview].
39. This was Alex Hoffman, who worked for the UFW briefly in the mid-1960s.
Interview with Marshall Ganz, Former Executive Committee Member, UFW, in Cambridge,
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For more complex legal matters, Chavez turned to outside labor lawyers.
But these experiences, too, were frustrating. Farm workers were exempt
from the NLRA, but the labor lawyers whom the union consulted were
often so mired in its restrictions that they could not respond creatively to
the unique possibilities and needs of a farm labor organizing campaign.
Starting in 1966, Chavez began to seek legal support from the newly-
founded California Rural Legal Assistance corporation ("CRLA"), one of
the first federally-funded legal service organizations. Although CRLA was
explicitly prohibited by the terms of its federal funding from representing
any union, sympathetic attorneys within CRLA found ways to pursue
Chavez's goals through impact litigation. Not unpredictably, this collabo-
ration soon unraveled in the face of tension about goals and strategies.
CRLA sought to make decisions about legal tactics that would lead to a
victory in court. The Union, on the other hand, often preferred a course of
action that was riskier in legal terms but that it judged more likely to
advance its long-term organizing goals. But the Union could not be
CRLA's client; therefore, it had no official say in the matter.4° While
sporadic collaboration would continue over the years, it was clear by 1967
that CRLA could not consistently provide the UFW with the sort of
representation it needed. As Chavez realized, the Union had reached a
point where it needed its own sophisticated legal strategist.
41
For the Union's first general counsel, Chavez chose Jerome "Jerry"
Cohen, who had graduated from Boalt Hall and gone to work at CRLA just
Mass. (May 25, 2000) [hereinafter Ganz Interview].
40. Telephone Interview with James Lorenz, Founding Attorney, CLRA (Mar. 27,
2000) [hereinafter Lorenz Interview]; Interview with Gary Bellow, Founding Attorney,
CLRA, in Boston, Mass. (Sept. 10, 1999) [hereinafter Bellow Interview]. At the time of our
interview Bellow was a professor at Harvard Law School; in the 1960s he had been a
founding attorney at the CLRA. See also Stephen B. Hitchner, "California Legal Services,
Inc. (C)", John F. Kennedy School of Government Case Program C24-75-011 (1975)
[hereinafter Kennedy School Case], and related case studies (C24-75-009, -010, and -012)
(dealing with the founding of the CRLA and its internal conflicts). Although pseudonyms
are used for key figures in the Kennedy School Case, and some identifying details have been
changed, Bellow recommended it to me as an accurate depiction of the events that it
describes. It was generated as a teaching tool rather than as a purely factual analysis;
therefore, I have restricted my reliance on it to direct quotes from Bellow and other major
figures or to points where it is corroborated by at least one other source. The case was later
condensed and adapted with some changes into a chapter titled "Lawyers for a Political
Movement" in PHILIP B. HEYMANN & LANCE LIEBMAN, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF
LAWYERS: CASE STUDIES 22 (1988).
41. Interview with Jerry Cohen, Former General Counsel, UFW, in Carmel, Cal. (July
22, 1999) [hereinafter Cohen Interview]. "[W]hat Cesar said to workers and what Cesar
said to me initially was, 'You are not going to represent individual workers, unless it fits
with what you think you need to do to serve the general goal.' So, we downplayed the whole
notion of service work." Id. "I was going to look at the needs of the Union as a union and I
was going to take on only problems related to those needs." JAMES, supra note 37, at 326.
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months earlier. As a basketball player at Woodrow Wilson High School in
D.C., Cohen had sought to abolish fraternities after hearing that a teammate
had been beaten during an initiation rite, a battle he continued once he
reached Amherst College. By the time he reached law school in Berkeley
in 1963, he was primed to enter the current of movement sweeping
campuses all over the country. At Boalt Hall he became active in the Free
Speech Movement and the resistance to the Vietnam War, and spent a
summer at the Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Library, cataloguing civil rights
cases so movement attorneys would be aware of what was going on in trial
courts around the country. When he joined the UFW, he had already
developed a powerful combination of strategic legal thinking, passion for
social change, and a love for a good fight. Over the next thirteen years,
Cohen and his staff would break new frontiers in their exploration of how
law could protect, open opportunities for, and advance the Union's external
organizing goals.
42
Under Chavez's supportive direction, Cohen soon grew into a broad
role within the UFW. He gained Chavez's trust swiftly. In 1967, shortly
after Cohen began work, an outside labor lawyer working for the UFW had
made a practice of automatically signing consent decrees with the National
Labor Relations Board on the Union's behalf, agreeing that the Union
would not engage in secondary boycotts (that is, boycotts of stores carrying
boycotted grapes). 43 Although the NLRA bans secondary boycotts for the
unions it covers, the flip side of the exclusion of agricultural work from the
NLRA's protections was that farm workers were not bound by the NLRA's
rules. In this case, however, there was an argument that the NLRA applied,
since nine workers in a commercial peanut shed on one of the ranches were
NLRA-covered employees." One of Cohen's first contributions to the
Union was to create a new union called "United Peanut Shelling Workers
of America," with the AFL-CIO's support, and move the shed employees
into it. Once the UFW no longer represented these NLRA-covered
workers, it was once again free to use the secondary boycott. 45 This insight
42. Note the parallels between this approach and "second dimension lawyering" as
described by Lucie E. White in To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Dreifontein on Lawyer-
ing and Power, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 699, 758-60 (1988).
43. "They weren't doing anything out of malice. It's just that.., the NLRB is the way
they understood things .... [So] you can't secondary boycott, and we sign those orders.
And they didn't ask why." Cohen Inte.rview, supra note 41.
44. If a union includes any employees covered by the NLRA, the union becomes a
"labor organization" subject to the NLRA prohibitions on the secondary boycott. NLRA §
2(5) ("The term 'labor organization' means any organization of any kind ... in which
employees participate.").
45. The UFW repeated this maneuver several times over the following decades,
divesting itself of workers in commercial sheds so as not to fall under the NLRA's
limitations. In the 1990s, however, the Union made a decision to organize workers outside
of the fields as a part of a decision to broaden its reach into the Mexican community. As
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had eluded more established labor lawyers, and it earned Cohen Chavez's
respect, sparking a sense of confidence that grew over the ensuing years.
After seeing "The Godfather" in 1973, Union staff jokingly came to refer to
Cohen as Chavez's "consigliere.
46
Chavez worked with Cohen to develop an approach to lawyering that
put the achievement of organizing goals above the achievement of legal
victories. For example soon after Cohen started work for the UFW a judge
took away the Union's right to use bullhorns in an early strike against the
Giumarra company. Cohen proudly returned from appellate court with a
writ of prohibition blocking the order, but he received a cold response from
Chavez, who believed that the best organizing use of the situation would be
to use a bullhorn in violation of the judge's order, get thrown in jail, and
attract publicity and support for the cause 7.4  Through a series of similar
encounters, Cohen and Chavez honed their communication. This process
was replicated as Cohen brought new attorneys onto the Union's legal staff,
each of whom brought his or her own strengths but who also had to be
soon as one non-agricultural worker was organized, the entire UFW became subject to
NLRA prohibitions on secondary boycotts. The sacrifice was blunted by the fact that the
boycott was no longer as important a Union strategy by that time. Cohen Interview, supra
note 41, and subsequent personal communication with the author; Telephone Interview with
Ira "Buddy" Gottlieb, Former Staff Attorney, UFW (Mar. 23, 2005) [hereinafter Gottlieb
Interview].
46. "Cesar, and Jerry, and a whole bunch of us went to Bakersfield to see The
Godfather. And of course we loved it. And after that, we all talked Godfather for a year,
two years, three years. And so Jerry was the consigliere. That's what he was. Because he
was clearly part of the action. But he was also in this kind of special role over there." Ganz
Interview, supra note 39.
47. Cohen Interview, supra note 41.
We got some pretty straight communication pretty early in the game because
when we struck Giumarra,.. . one of the things this one judge did was that he
took away our bullhorns. Turns out, you know, you really can't do that. I mean,
you have a right to use a bullhorn in rural California ... I thought. So I told
Cesar I was going to take a writ. And he didn't have any faith in that. So he,
without letting me know, was planning on just going out there and using the
horn and getting thrown in jail. So I bop in one day, after going up to the
appellate court in Fresno, and say "I've got this writ of prohibition. We're
getting our bullhorns back."
"Oh, fuck!" he screams .... I can't-"
I said, "Well, Cesar, you know, you better be straight then .... If you wanted
to violate, let me know."
"Well, I didn't think you were going to get your writ."
I said, "Well, it was pretty clear." And I told him how I got the writ. So from
that point on, it was like, "Okay, I'll level with Jerry." You know, so we're on
the same page.
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immersed in the culture of UFW legal and organizing strategy before
beginning to work effectively as an integral part of it.
48
Cohen strategized with Chavez not just about the legal aspects of the
Union's work but about its overall direction. He and the attorneys he hired
led the fight against restrictive farm labor legislation in several states.
They negotiated contracts with growers. But most of all, in the UFW's
early years, Cohen and his staff litigated. They went to court to defend the
Union, its volunteers, 49 and its members. They went to court to establish
legal protections for farm worker organizing. And they went to court to
spread the word about the UFW and to bring public pressure to bear on
opponents in various ways. '0 In each situation, the question was never
only "what are our rights here?," but "how can we best turn this legal
situation to the Union's organizing advantage?"
1. Defending the Union
Before long, Cohen hired a few young lawyers to work with him.51
Much of their daily work involved defending the Union and its members.
Like all effective organizing efforts, the UFW generated a strong legal
backlash. Pickets were stopped with injunctions, protesters were arrested
(sometimes unexpectedly, sometimes en masse after the UFW launched
civil disobedience campaigns involving-up to thousands of workers at a
time), striking workers were evicted from farm labor camps, and the Union
48. None of the other attorneys enjoyed the same level of Chavez's trust as Cohen,
despite Cohen's effort to facilitate an eventual shift in legal leadership. Cohen recalls:
[W]hen my kids started to get a little older, and I knew I needed to think about
ways of actually earning enough money to put them through college, I told
Cesar, "At some point, you know, there might have to be a transition [to another
general counsel]." He did not like that.... And I would bring Sandy [Nathan,
a staff lawyer, to meetings with Cesar]. I thought Sandy had really good
instincts. And Cesar once got me aside and said, "You know, it's really chicken
shit of you to bring Sandy. I know what you're doing."
Cohen Interview, supra note 41.
49. The UFW operated on a "volunteer" basis, under which most staff-including
organizers and paralegals-received a weekly stipend (initially $5 and later $10 per week)
as well as room and board in lieu of a salary. Exceptions were made for lawyers, who
received a monthly stipend that began at $600 (for a total annual salary of $7,200), and for a
few other professionals. Cohen Interview, supra note 41; TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 14.
50. Gary Bellow has written about these functions of litigation as a part of an
organizing campaign, a perspective inspired in part by his work with Chavez and the UFW
beginning in 1967. Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner's Reflections on Political
Lawyering, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 297 (1996).
51. Until 1973-74, when the UFW mushroomed, the legal staff rarely had more than
three or four attorneys at a time, supported by paralegals and a steady stream of law
students. Cohen Interview, supra note 41; Telephone Interview with Sandy Nathan, Former
Staff Attorney, UFW (May 3, 2005) [hereinafter Nathan Interview].
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was slapped with grower lawsuits intended to slow down its efforts.52 It
was the legal department's responsibility to mount a defense against these
onslaughts.
To facilitate this, during the harvest season staff lawyers lived close to
the areas where organizing was most active. In major strikes, a law student
was assigned to every picket captain to document how strikers were treated
and to negotiate with police.53 Lawyers were on call when organizers
needed them to go to the fields because a sheriff had restricted picketing
beyond what was delineated in an injunction. A UFW lawyer or paralegal
standing by the side of a road bordering the fields, typewriter balanced on
the hood of a car, taking affidavits from workers, became a common
sight.
5 4
Just as lawyers responded to organizers' calls, so organizers turned
members out for hearings. Former staff attorney Barbara Rhine recalls,
[W]hen we went to court ... we would just pack the courtroom.
Boy, were things different if . . . every time the judge had to
make a ruling, he was facing an absolutely crowded courtroom,
with faces wreathed in wrinkles and hard work, and three
languages that had to be spoken, seeing the effect of the way the
law works on ordinary people. And we could do that. We could
get those people out .... But it depended not only on a hotshot
legal department, which we certainly had, but also on the
hundreds of people on the ground every day.55
52. One example of such a grower lawsuit was a case brought in 1969 by Fresno grape
growers against the UFW, arguing that the grape boycott violated antitrust law. Although
the growers eventually abandoned the suit, its defense occupied several years of UFW
attorney David Averbuck's and later Bill Carder's time. Telephone Interview with Bill
Carder, Former Staff Attorney, UFW (Apr. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Carder Interview].
53. Ganz Interview, supra note 39. By the summer of 1973, when the Union responded
to the devastation of its grape contracts by the Teamsters with a massive campaign of
protest and civil disobedience, law students were flooding into the UFW, drawn to its fights
against poverty and for civil rights and by its anti-Vietnam War position. Many of those
same students were hired by the Union after they graduated. Others went on to work as
attorneys for the ALRB, and still others continued on to practice labor law on behalf of
other unions. Nathan Interview, supra note 51; Telephone Interview with Ellen Greenstone,
Former Staff Attorney, UFW (Apr. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Greenstone Interview].
54. Interview with Jessica Govea, Former Lead Organizer, UFW, in New York, N.Y.
(Oct. 13, 1999) [hereinafter Govea Interview].
55. Telephone Interview with Barbara Rhine, Former Staff Attorney, UFW (Mar. 27,
2000) [hereinafter Rhine Interview]. See also Alfredo Santos's description of the day in
1974 that he brought Watsonville apple strikers to court in San Francisco where UFW
attorney Sandy Nathan was arguing their case. E-mail from Alfredo Santos (July
1, 2004), in CESAR CHAVEZ: THE FARMWORKER MOVEMENT 1962-1993 (LeRoy
Chatfield ed., Farmworker Movement Documentation Project CD-ROM, 2005),
http://www.farmworkermovement.org (follow "Discussion Archive" link, then "July, 2004"
link, then scroll to page 2) [collection hereinafter referred to as The Documentation Project].
The Union prevailed in that case, establishing a right to notice before the issuance of a
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In the process, many UFW lawyers and law students built strong
relationships with the organizers in their area. Rhine describes it as "a...
partnership... a wonderful marriage between what was happening on the
ground and in the courts."56 Organizer Jessica Govea agreed. "[O]ur legal
team was ... just on .... [T]hey were there, [and] ... they worked hard.
[T]hey had a role."57
Among other aspects of the collaboration, attorneys responded to calls
from organizers to free workers from jail or INS detention. They
sometimes ended up detained themselves. Attorney Sandy Nathan was
jailed in 1975 when he demanded access to a group of workers just arrested
by the INS from a Salinas ranch where their votes were crucial in winning
an upcoming election. The INS refused, and called the police when he
persisted.58 Two years later, the police arrested Nathan again for insisting
on access to twenty-five tomato pickers and a UFW organizer being held in
a jail cell. As the door to the cell opened so that an officer could shove him
in with the others, the organizer smiled and said to the workers, "See, I told
you our lawyer would be here!",59 On the police report for Nathan's arrest,
under the box marked "Weapon," the officer scrawled a single word:
"Mouth. ,60
2. Shaping the Law
As UFW lawyers defended the Union in jail and in court, they also
sought to wrest from the Constitution a web of rights-to use bullhorns, to
picket, to boycott-that could curtail a judge's leeway to use injunctions to
shut down strikes and provide a basic framework for farm worker
organizing in the absence of NLRA coverage. The UFW's battle with the
injunction echoed that of the labor movement in the days before labor law.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, judges readily issued
temporary restraining order. United Farm Workers of Am. v. Super. Ct. of Santa Cruz
County (William Buak Fruit Co., Inc,, Real Party in Interest) 537 P.2d 1237 (1975).
56. Rhine Interview, supra note 55.
57. Govea Interview, supra note 54. This symbiosis did not occur in all places or at all
times:
Most of the lawyers lived separately [from organizers] with one another, and
worked separately, with great camaraderie on the law stuff.... [For them] it
was more like a typical law office, albeit energetic and full of good motives.
Getting up in the morning, and going to work, and doing a lot of law.
Rhine Interview, supra note 55. Even the lawyers who worked most closely with organizers
during the agricultural season spent the winters doing legal "projects" divorced from
immediate organizing work.
58. Nathan Interview, supra note 51.
59. Id.
60. d
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injunctions barring or severely limiting strikes and pickets, stymieing union
organizing efforts. 6' The passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932 had
effectively ended this practice under federal law, and the Wagner Act three
years later put the final seal on its coffin. But since state law offered ample
opportunity to restrict farm labor pickets, and since agricultural workers
were exempt from the Wagner Act's protections, the UFW continued to
work under a regime of government-by-injunction.62 One scene from a
documentary made by the UFW about the strikes in the summer of 1973
graphically illustrates the problem. A young Tom Dalzell, a UFW legal
worker (and later staff attorney) stands by the side of a narrow road running
between two fields, as strikers swirl around him. He explains what has just
happened:
About thirty minutes ago Lieutenant Yoxsimer from the Sheriffs
Department came over and asked everyone to move over to this
side of the street, saying there would be no problems if we did,
and then about ten minutes ago he came back and decided that
there was also an injunction on this side of the street, so we have
to be 60 feet from that property line and 60 feet from this
property line, which puts us somewhere up in the air. For all
intents and purposes, we have no right to picket.63
In fighting injunctions, victory in court was often important to Cohen
and his staff.64 Indeed, UFW litigation resulted in a string of important
constitutional decisions in California, which to this day guarantee picketers
the right to use bullhorns or other amplification to communicate their
message to workers in the fields,65 prohibit the issuance of temporary
61. William Forbath, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 201
(1991).
62. "[T]oday we still have more injunctions than we have letters of the alphabet."
LEVY, supra note 32, at 155. See also JAMES, supra note 37, at 327 (describing injunctions
in the context of the Giumarra grape strike of 1967).
63. FIGHTING FOR OUR LIvES: THE UNITED FARM WORKERS' 1973 GRAPE STRIKE
(United Farm Workers of America, 1974) (hereinafter UFW, FIGHTING FOR OR LIVES].
64. The UFW was aided in its battle with injunctions by the California Supreme Court's
In re Berry decision, 436 P.2d 273 (1968), which holds that those aversely affected by an
injunction can test its constitutionality by violating it. However, if the court eventually finds
that the injunction was valid, the violator can be punished. This offered the Union a
measure of protection, at least when Cohen and the other attorneys were right in guessing
which injunctions would ultimately be held unconstitutional. In re Berry put a premium on
the UFW legal department's capacity to determine in advance which injunctions would
ultimately be held unconstitutional. Chavez recognized the benefits of this work and gave
Cohen the time he needed to immerse himself in the relevant law. Recalls Cohen, "Bill
[Carder] and I spent hours reading anti-trust law and civil rights law." Interview by Jacques
Levy with Jerry Cohen in the Jacques E. Levy Research Collection on Cesar Chavez, Yale
Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library.
(September 20-21, 1993) [hereinafter 1993 Levy Interview with Cohen].
65. United Farm Workers Organizing Comm. v. Super. Ct. of Kern County, 62 Cal.
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restraining orders against picketers (or whenever First Amendment rights
are implicated) unless all parties have received notice of the hearing,66 and
recognize a First Amendment right for organizers and attorneys to have
access to migrant labor camps.67  These legal victories-as well as the
lower-level daily triumphs that delayed eviction by a few days or permitted
a picket to continue over a weekend-were concretely useful to the
Union's organizers and won the legal department the deep appreciation of
leaders such as Dolores Huerta, Gilbert Padilla, and Chavez himself.
3. Using Legal Strategies Offensively to Build Power
As important as legal victory could be, the Union often had other
goals for its lawsuits as well, and it litigated aggressively to achieve them.
Cohen refers to much of his work during this period as "legal karate and
the law of the jungle," using the law as an offensive weapon to advance the
UFW's organizing goals and build power for the Union.68 The Union
threatened and filed lawsuits designed to put collateral pressure on all
fronts of its fight: to gain information about particular growers and the
industry through discovery, to convince consumers and stores to respect the
boycott, to increase the growers' legal bills and weaken their resolve, and
to pressure government officials to change their policies and practices.
The UFW recognized that the discovery phase of a lawsuit (in which
parties use written interrogatories and oral depositions to gather infor-
mation from the other side) could uncover otherwise unavailable data about
growers, data that could be very useful in planning boycotts and other
organizing strategies. Former CRLA lawyer Gary Bellow described one
such deposition that he carried out in an early CRLA lawsuit related to a
UFW organizing campaign. When a farm worker appeared at the
McFarland CRLA office in 1967, angry that he had been fired from the
Bernardi grape ranch for his allegiance to the UFW, Bellow brought suit on
his behalf alleging that ranch owners' sweetheart contracts with the
Teamsters had deprived a UFW member of his rights. Within the
framework of the lawsuit, Bellow used depositions as a research tool for
Rptr. 567 (1967).
66. United Farm Workers of Am. v. Super. Ct. of Santa Cruz County (William Buak
Fruit Co., Inc., Real Party in Interest) 537 P.2d 1237, 1244 (1975).
67. Id. at 1242. UFW litigation later played an important role in clarifying the scope of
California's Moscone Bill, a so-called "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" signed into law in
1976 to echo on a state level the federal protections against labor injunctions. CAL. Crv.
PROC. CODE § 527.3 (West 1979).
68. Cohen notes that his ability to use the law offensively, not just defensively,
depended on the funding that Chavez provided his department. "[O]nce Cesar saw things
could work, by about '75, I had a lot of resources to deal with." Cohen Interview, supra
note 41. Thus they could attack as well as protect.
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the union's ongoing campaign.
[T]he next thing I did was to take depositions of the Bernardis-
"What subsidiaries do you have? What do you own? How much
grape do you ship? How many workers do you have that were not
members of the union?"-because they were relevant to the law
suit. And suddenly the union realized that with a lawyer it could
get information that it couldn't get any other way.69
The UFW continued to use depositions this way over time. Growers
would sue the Union for damages from the boycott, claiming that it had
damaged their market. In response, during discovery the UFW would ask
relevant questions about the grower's client base and its geographic reach.
As Cohen describes it, the Union won either way: either the grower
dropped the suit to avoid giving up this valuable data, or it answered,
handing the boycott much-needed information.70
During some court battles, the UFW sought to influence both public
opinion and the legal outcome by using the courthouse as a stage on which
to publicize the farm workers' plight. At several critical moments, for
example, the union mobilized members to conduct vigils, sing and pray in
courthouse corridors as the judge decided a case involving the UFW. As
Cohen recalls, in one case in 1968 where Chavez, then on the thirteenth day
of a fast, was cited for contempt of a growers' injunction, UFW members
came to court by the hundreds.
[W]orkers all around the building, workers lining every wall of
the courthouse .... [T]he workers were singing softly, and they
were praying .... We hadn't been having too much luck in that
courthouse before, because it's really the growers' courthouse.
But I think everybody that morning knew it was our courthouse."
The grower's lawyer asked the judge to remove the farm workers from the
courthouse, but the judge refused, saying "'If I kick these workers out of
this courthouse, that will be just another example of goddamn gringo
justice. I can't do it."' 7 2 As Cohen reflects, "Things started to shift there.
That had nothing to do with legal argument. That had to do with just raw
organizing power."73 Another approach was to bring farm workers in to
69. Kennedy School Case, supra note 40, at B-14.
70. 1993 Levy Interview with Cohen, supra note 64.
71. LEVY, supra note 32, at 280-81 (quoting Jerry Cohen). In this, as in so many other
of its strategies, the UFW and its attorneys were inspired by the civil rights movement,
where participants also came to witness court proceedings and to pray and sing in
courthouse corridors and yards as a way of changing the atmosphere in which legal
decisions were made.
72. Id. at 281 (Cohen quoting Judge Walter Osborne).
73. Cohen Interview, supra note 41. The Union used similar techniques at other times.
Taylor describes a different occasion in 1970 during the Union's fight against the grower
Bud Antle:
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tell their stories in court, or to use affidavits to bring farm workers'
experiences in the fields and on the picket line into the courtroom.7" Unlike
many of the big political trials of the 1960s and 1970s, the UFW was not
trying to disrupt the actual court proceedings or to reveal the legal system
as a fraud. 75 The idea was to change the immediate cultural, political, and
moral environment in which legal decisions were made. The press played
an important role in this strategy, disseminating the Union's message
widely and intensifying the pressure on its opponents.
The Union's focus on a broad range of outcomes from its legal work
grew from its doubt that justice for farm workers could be obtained directly
from a state court system that historically had favored growers (the result
both of law that worked to the growers' advantage and of judges who were
inclined to see matters from the growers' perspective). Cohen remarks, "I
don't think given the courts I was operating in I had a lot of faith that we
could win lawsuits., 76 In addition, court results came years after they were
On December 4th the UFWOC turned out 3,000 farm workers; they ringed the
Monterey County courthouse, in Salinas, they lined the front entlyway and the
hallways. Kneeling or standing, they remained absolutely silent as Chavez and
Cohen went inside. The hearing lasted three and a half hours, and, when
Chavez refused to call off the Antle boycott, as ordered, the judge ordered him
jailed. As he was being led away Chavez shouted, "Boycott the hell out of
them."
The UFWOC workers set up a "vigil" around the jail, union priests said a
Mass and were arrested by the police for failing to get city permits for public
meetings. The UFWOC held rallies, and the widows of Robert Kennedy and
Martin Luther King, Jr., came to visit Chavez in his cell....
By December 24th even Judge Campbell had had enough; the thought of what
Chavez's supporters might do if their leader was still in jail on Christmas Day
helped the judge make up his mind to release Chavez, pending the outcome of
the appeals filed by the union's attorney.
TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 260-61. Courtrooms were not the only places farm workers
packed. As a part of the effort to win the ALRA, the UFW brought members to legislative
committee hearings, lobbying meetings, and voting sessions. For example, Cohen describes
the farm worker presence at one early committee hearing on the bill as "jam packed and in
the hall." Interview by Jacques Levy with Jerry Cohen, Sandy Nathan, and Tony Gaenslen
in the Jacques E. Levy Research Collection on Cesar Chavez, Yale Collection of Western
Americana, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library (June 19, 1975) [hereinafter 1975
Levy Interview with Cohen, Nathan, and Gaenslen].
74. Telephone Interview with Peter Haberfeld, Former Staff Attorney, UFW (Mar. 28,
2000) [hereinafter Haberfeld Interview].
75. See Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical
Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369 (1982-83)
(describing the political trial approach). For the memoirs of one of the most famous
proponents of the approach, see WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER & SHEILA ISENBERG, My LIFE AS A
RADICAL LAWYER (1994) (chronicling Kunstler's life and his work as a lawyer for social
movements).
76. Cohen Interview, supra note 41. Cohen felt comfortable in the face of the
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needed to resolve the issues that arose in organizing. For example, when
the UFW was organizing in Texas and the Texas Rangers were beating up
farm workers who supported the union, a Houston lawyer, Chris Dixie,
filed a case to enjoin the practice. Cohen recalls,
I used to call Chris Dixie about this case. [He would say,]
"These things take tahm, Jerry." I mean, the strike is long over,
and they're still pushing on whether the Rangers should have
been enjoined. And the Supreme Court says, by God, five years
later, "they should have been." Now there's timely relief for
you.
77
UFW lawsuits often had multiple targets. For example, cases against
growers relating to sanitary and health conditions in the field were also
intended to pressure regulators to enforce laws on the books, and to
convince consumers that it was in their own best interest not to buy grapes.
One such suit related to toilets in the fields. Faced with workers' reports
that they were relieving themselves in the fields because growers did not
provide facilities for them, the legal team built a case with three organizing
angles. First, of course, the suit pressured the state to enforce laws
requiring field toilets, getting the workers what they needed. Second, with
the suit as proof, "boycotters could say, 'Hey, do you really want to eat
those grapes? Do you know where those people have to go to the
bathroom?' 78  Third, the combination pushed growers a step closer to
seeing a settlement with the UFW on the union issue as a favorable
alternative to such pervasive pressure if they resisted.
Similarly, but at much greater length and with tremendous
effectiveness, the Union sued the government around issues relating to the
use of deadly pesticides in the cultivation of grapes. To understand the role
that these lawsuits played requires a brief detour into laws regarding
boycotts. Unfettered by the NLRA's ban on secondary activity, the Union
was free to call for boycotts of stores that sold non-union produce and
products. To clarify, a primary boycott is when the union asks consumers
accusation that he too readily accepted the limitations of the court system-that he should
instead have been fighting to reform it. In his inimitable style, he told one interviewer in the
early 1970s that he agreed that the courts were in need of reform, "[b]ut you can't chop
down a redwood tree with your dick. What you have got to do is isolate the problems you
can work on and change and, if you can change that one, then move on to the next one."
JAMES, supra note 37, at 335. In addition, over time (and particularly through lengthy
appeals), Cohen did prevail in many cases. See supra notes 65 to 67 and accompanying
text.
77. Cohen Interview, supra note 41.
78. Id. UFW lawyers brought a similar case during the Gallo strike in 1973, which they
referred to as the "shitty water suit," and which dealt with the presence of chloroform
bacteria in the water supply for Gallo labor camps. Pictures and publicity related to the suit
were used in the boycott. Haberfeld Interview, supra note 74.
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not to buy a particular product grown or manufactured by an employer with
which the union has a dispute. A secondary boycott broadens the focus
beyond the immediate employer; for example, when the union asks
consumers to avoid an entire store because it sells the boycotted product.
For the UFW, secondary boycotts were a much more powerful weapon.
Consider the task faced by a consumer seeking to support a primary boy-
cott of grapes. Grapes are sold loose, with no markings. To determine
whether a particular bunch of grapes for sale at a grocer store was from a
union grower, she would need to find a store employee who was willing to
scrounge around the storeroom looking for the original crate in which the
grapes had arrived, and examine it for the UFW's black eagle stamp. But if
the UFW could call secondary boycotts against grocery stores that sold
non-union grapes, the consumer's task was made vastly easier: avoid the
bad stores and buy at the good. This strategy had the further advantage of
magnifying the economic pressure on non-union growers because each
supermarket or chain of markets that came to insist on union grapes to
avoid the boycott represented the loss of many thousands of dollars in
sales, as opposed to the negligible impact from the withdrawal of each
individual consumer.
In the context of the grape boycott, highly publicized cases where
union members were deprived of basic rights became as important for their
effect on the sympathies of potential boycotters as for the outcome of the
cases themselves. 79 One morning, union legal worker-and later lead
organizer-Jessica Govea brought in several women who were covered in
rashes, nauseated and sweating, talking about a white powder on the vines
in which they worked. Cohen was distracted by other crises, but faced with
Govea's gentle persistence, he eventually approached the office of the local
Agricultural Commissioner to request information about the chemicals
sprayed in the fields on their ranch. The spraying company immediately
got an injunction forbidding the agency from releasing the information to
Cohen. The injunction was upheld in court.8° Technically, this was a
defeat for the UFW. But as Cohen says, "people know what is going on if
they won't show you the records."81 Cohen brought the problem to the
attention of the Subcommittee on Migratory Labor of the United States
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, chaired by Senator Walter
Mondale. The controversy heightened when boycott organizers tested
grapes for sale at a Washington, D.C., Safeway and discovered that the
levels of pesticide on them were dangerously high. 82 Pesticide-related
79. TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 211.
80. Cohen v. Super. Ct. of Kern County (Atwood Aviation Co., Real Party in Interest)
72 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1968).
81. JAMES, supra note 37, at 331.
82. TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 241. Senator George Murphy then accused Cohen of
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cases became a major focus of the legal department's work. As with the
toilet litigation, they subjected growers to a triple-whammy: the cost of
defending the suit, the price of responding to heightened scrutiny from state
regulators, and an economic squeeze from disgusted consumers. The
combination pushed growers a step closer to seeing a settlement with the
UFW on the union issue as a favorable alternative to continued resistance.
As the pesticide claims proceeded, the Union kept up a steady barrage
of other types of lawsuits against growers (for example, back wage claims,
tort suits for on-the-job injuries, and cases under California's limited Labor
Code), 3 the government (for example, § 1983 actions against government
officials for civil rights violations), 4 and others." Meanwhile, although
growers and their political allies were the UFW's chief opponents, they
were not its only ones. At times, the UFW's most insidious adversary was
another union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The Teamsters
saw the UFW's success in organizing farm workers as an opportunity to
ally with growers, inviting them to sign so-called "sweetheart" contracts
that benefited both the Teamsters and the growers while denying workers
many of the benefits and protections of UFW representation. 6 Teamster
contracts were written without worker knowledge or input, and had few
mechanisms for worker participation, no protection from pesticides, and
inadequate grievance procedures.8 7 Workers who refused to agree to
having "doctored" the grapes sent in for testing. When Cohen was vindicated, the UFW's
credibility in the public eye soared. Telephone Interview with Jerry Cohen, Former
Attorney, CLRA (Mar. 30, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 Interview with Cohen].
83. Other examples of lawsuits brought to pressure growers are described by former
UFW attorney Chuck Farnsworth.
In one instance, an irrigation district was sued by two union members who
claimed that publicly subsidized water was being distributed to growers beyond
their 160-acre legal allotment. In another suit, the union itself charged that the
California Table Grape Commission was funding anti-union efforts, rather than
mere advertising. Both suits were later settled before trial.
Memoir of Chuck Farnsworth, Documentation Project, http://farmworkermovement.org
(follow "Essays" link, then "Essays by Author" link, then "Chuck Farnsworth 1969-1973"
link).
84. Former UFW attorney Bill Carder notes that this is another example of the way that
the UFW's legal strategy "took a page from the book of the civil rights movement's
lawyers." Carder Interview, supra note 52.
85. For example, the UFW sued Safeway in 1973 for selling mislabeled meat. Avelina
Coriell v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County (Safeway Stores, Inc., Real Party In Interest), 114 Cal.
Rptr. 310 (1974). While Safeway had, indeed, falsely presented low-grade meat as better
quality, the Union's primary goal was not to address Safeway's consumer information but to
increase the pressure on the grocery chain to respect the grape boycott.
86. Sweetheart contracts, a classic manifestation of union corruption, are ones in which
the union and management (who are ostensibly opponents) collude to make an agreement
that benefits both of them at the expense of the workers.
87. MAnKA & MAMA, supra note 31, at 202.
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Teamster representation were immediately fired. This arrangement worked
to the great advantage of both the employers, who understood that the
Teamsters would not be "stirring up" their workforce as the UFW would,
and the Teamsters, who took in hundreds of thousands of dollars in dues in
exchange for minimal work. When the UFW fought back through strikes
and pickets demanding free elections, Teamsters turned out by the busload
to hurl racial epithets, throw bottles and stones, and beat farm workers and
their supporters.88
Lawsuits played an important role-and, in the end, became the
determinative factor-in the UFW's strategy to get the Teamsters Union
out of the fields. While researching antitrust case law in 1970 as a part of
his defense of a suit filed against the Union by Fresno grape growers (their
claim was that the Union's grape boycott was a "conspiracy in restraint of
trade," a classic violation of the Antitrust Act), UFW attorney Bill Carder
began to wonder whether there might be an argument that the Teamsters'
and growers' efforts to undercut the UFW's representation by signing sham
contracts could be cast as a conspiracy to depress wages and benefits, also
an antitrust violation.89 The case that Carder developed out of this idea
(and its companion § 1983 civil rights action) survived a 1973 motion to
dis-miss, entered a massive discovery phase, and eventually settled in 1977
with the Teamsters Union signing a pact in which it agreed to withdraw
from farm worker organizing.
9
0
Unlike the defensive cases or the constitutional protections that Cohen
sought, the point of these particular suits against growers, the government,
and the Teamsters was not to win the legal claim through the courts. Here,
the Union had as least as much interest in the opportunities the litigation
offered along the way as in its legal outcome. Reflecting on the pesticide
issue, Cohen notes,
The beauty of working with a movement is that whether you win
or lose is sometimes entirely irrelevant, because there's not a
88. The Teamsters have a long and shameful history of corruption, in which the UFW
rivalry is but one chapter. In 1957, the Teamsters union was expelled from the AFL-CIO on
corruption charges; it was not brought back into the AFL-CIO for thirty years. For accounts
of this and of the effort to reform the Teamsters, see KENNETH C. CROWE, COLLISION: How
THE RANK AND FILE TOOK BACK THE TEAMSTERS (1993); DAVID WITWER, CORRUPTION AND
REFORM IN THE TEAMSTERS UNION (2003).
89. Unions covered by the NLRA (such as the Teamsters) are ordinarily exempt from
antitrust law. Carder's theory was that the egregiousness of the Teamsters' actions rendered
this an exception. The resulting sweetheart agreements between the Teamsters and the
growers, he argued, were not normal labor contracts, but evidence of a "conspiracy to
artificially regulate the price of work." Interview by Jacques Levy with Jerry Cohen in the
Jacques E. Levy Research Collection on Cesar Chavez, Yale Collection of Western
Americana, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library (Oct. 15, 1995) [hereinafter 1995
Levy Interview with Cohen].
90. Carder Interview, supra note 52; MAJKA & MAJKA, supra note 31, at 246.
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defeat you can't turn into some kind of victory. If we had won
on that original pesticide thing and gotten the records then we
would have had them. But, even if we lose ... [w]e ... get to
present our case ... and you begin to talk about pesticides and
you begin to drive an issue home .... So it doesn't matter if they
say we can't see the records because then we go to the public and
say that they won't show us the records.9 '
Such lawsuits were most important as a way to get data, to "illustrate
issues" to the public and to increase pressure on merchants to the point
where they would assist the boycott, to push the Teamsters to end
interference with UFW contracts, and to move ranch owners to agree to
unionization. Once the Union had achieved its goal, these claims were
often traded or dropped.92
B. The ALRA
In December of 1972, as the UFW's grape contracts approached their
expiration date, Teamsters president Frank Fitzsimmons appeared at a
function for the Farm Bureau Federation (a growers' organization) and
91. JAMEs, supra note 37, at 330-31. UFW staff lawyers recall many such instances of
the attitude that "all legal outcomes can be organizing victories." For example, staff
attorney Barbara Rhine spoke with Cesar Chavez the night before a big hearing in which the
UFW was fighting the eviction of striking Gallo workers en masse from the Gallo labor
camp. Rhine feared that they would lose the injunction, and said as much to Chavez. "He
said, '[L]ook, Barbara, don't think of it that way. Think about this: if we lose, we'll get
pictures [of the evictions] and how it's going to help the boycott.' In other words, whatever
happens, we're going to exploit it for its full advantage as organizers." Haberfeld Interview,
supra note 74. (Haberfeld, then Rhine's husband, was present at the conversation). The
Union did win the injunction that day, but the workers were later evicted individually.
Rhine, who was first in her class at Boalt Hall, recalls this ending as an important jolt of
realism about the possibilities of change through legal talent. "I bought them a little time,
that's all, and the battle went on. The people who own the property get to control who lives
there. Not all the Boalt law degrees and Law Review and all the intelligence in the world
could make a difference in that." Rhine Interview, supra note 55.
92. Though using lawsuits as leverage was often effective, it raised important ethical
issues, particularly when claims of individual workers were involved, as they often were.
Cohen and the UFW legal team strategically chose cases involving individual workers
against whom growers had committed torts or California Labor Code violations, and filed
their claims as "bee-stings in the battle." Additionally, claims of individual workers were
folded into larger suits such as the pesticides claim. These sorts of cases raise the specter of
conflicts of interest, as the outcome the workers wanted as individuals and the outcome the
Union sought as an organization were not necessarily the same thing. Cohen dealt with
these conflicts by maintaining full disclosure before the fact. He also observed that many
workers saw the winning of a union contract as better serving their individual interests than
victory in a particular case. Cohen Interview, supra note 41. For a fuller discussion of the
ethical implications of this issue with regard to individual workers, see JENNIFER GORDON,
SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 209-11 (2005).
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exhorted growers to form an alliance with the Teamsters. 93 They listened
well. When the UFW contracts expired in 1973, 90% of the grape growers
signed agreements with the Teamsters.94 There were no elections; workers
were not consulted in the process. The UFW was left reeling, with no more
than 6,500 workers remaining under its representation.95 It was a dark and
bitter time for the Union.
Fast running out of money and desperate to rebuild, the UFW debated
whether to seek the passage of a state law that would prevent such raids
and create explicit rules for the organization of agricultural workers.96 The
UFW's staff and volunteers had wavered over the years about whether the
Union stood to lose or win in seeking to create a law that would govern its
conduct.9 7 On a practical level, the likelihood of wresting a good law from
the California legislature seemed dim for many years. More fundamen-
tally, Chavez and others had observed how legislation had seemed to take
the wind out of the sails of the civil rights movement in the South. 98
Certainly wholesale adoption of the NLRA seemed like the wrong solution,
given the increasingly evident way that law and the NLRB was coming to
shackle the labor unions that it governed.99 Some leaders further argued
that the UFW's freedom from labor legislation was a key to its success,
allowing it to operate as a social movement with a wide range of tactics,
free of the bureaucracy of the union establishment. 100 But the AFL-CIO
93. UFW, FIGHTING FOR OUR LivEs, supra note 63.
94. The Teamsters were not bound by the rules prohibiting AFL-CIO unions from
raiding each other's worksites, as they had been expelled from the AFL-CIO in 1957 for
corruption.
95. FERRISS & SANDOVAL, supra note 35, at 188; MAJKA & MAJKA, supra note 31 at
223.
96. Jerry Cohen recalls: "I had known enough about the way the rest of the labor
movement was operating to know that with a law, eventually down the road comes a whole
superstructure of anti-union lawyers. And ... no matter how positive the administration,
there's the whole question of getting yourself involved in the administrative nexus. Might
be necessary, but until it was, we were having too much fun .... And we were winning."
Cohen Interview, supra note 41.
97. It is important to remember that the time before the ALRA was not a "lawless" one
for the UFW. The Union still worked against a backdrop of formal rules and entitlements
(property, contract, criminal, immigration, etc.) that hugely favored growers. Likewise, it is
wrong to talk about the pre-ALRA period as one free of state intervention in organizing.
The state intervened often, whether to protect growers' property rights or, less often, to
permit protest as a constitutional right. To the extent there was favorable law to work
with-for example, the post-Civil War amendments to the Bill of Rights-the UFW often
stood on the legal shoulders of movements that had gone before. Thus the ALRA did not
create but instead refrained state interventions. It realigned the forces but did not create the
force field. For a fuller discussion of this issue see infra Part III.
98. LEVY, supra note 32, at 529.
99. Ronald B. Taylor, Why Chavez Spurns the Labor Act, THE NATION, April 12, 1971,
at 454; Cohen Interview, supra note 41; Nathan Interview, supra note 51.
100. Nathan Interview, supra note 51.
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was offering a strike fund of $1.6 million to the Union on the condition that
it make serious efforts to win an agricultural labor relations law.'l° And in
1974, victory in such an effort began to seem conceivable when Jerry
Brown replaced Ronald Reagan as governor of California. The Union
decided that its best hope for rebirth was to create an administrative
framework that would guarantee the UFW access to farm workers in the
fields, bar sweetheart deals between Teamsters and growers, and set legal
rules for elections and bargaining that would allow the UFW to recover the
contracts it had lost.
0 2
Cohen worked with the Union's organizers and lawyers to develop a
set of proposals that reflected what they had learned during the UFW's last
hard-fought decade about the sort of protections that would facilitate farm
labor organizing. Cohen brought these ideas to Chavez, who later recalled
that
Jerry Cohen made a list of all the issues as he saw them. Then he
met with the board and with me for many sessions. We went
over all the issues. I also met with the field office staffs, the
people who had been involved with the strikes, the workers, and
we just touched every single base we could. There was
tremendous input. So Jerry finally drew up an ideal bill.0 3
One approach might have been to scale down what the Union wanted so it
more closely resembled the realm of the possible. Although the Union had
sought a minimalist bill the year before, in 1975 Chavez and Cohen did not
101. Cohen recalls: "In '73 we lost all those grape contracts because the Teamsters
signed those sweetheart deals. And ... [Cesar] and I had gone back to see Meany about...
getting some help, and Meany sort of conditioned the help on us finally agreeing to some
kind of labor law .... [W]hat they wanted was a commitment, a commitment that we'd go
for the law." Cohen Interview, supra note 41. See also MAJKA & MAJKA supra note 31, at
221, 223. The AFL-CIO's reasons for seeking to bring the UFW under a labor law were
complex. On the one hand was a protective urge, a sense that such a law was the only way
for the UFW to vanquish the Teamsters and succeed on the mainstream labor movement's
terms, by winning election victories, negotiating collective bargaining agreements, and
collecting substantial dues. On the other was a desire to control the UFW, to rein it in. The
AFL-CIO felt pressure from its member unions most affected by the UFW's secondary
boycotts, in particular those covering supermarket workers such as the retail clerks and
butchers unions. These unions feared that their members would lose jobs due to the boycott.
The retail clerks went so far as to take out full-page newspaper advertisements opposing the
UFW boycott. MAJKA & MAJKA supra note 31, at 230. More generally, there was a sense
within the mainstream labor movement that the UFW was disruptive, eating up more than
its share of the public's energy and attention. There was friction between the UFW and the
AFL-CIO around the UFW's opposition to the Vietnam War (which the AFL-CIO
supported), its radicalism, and its social movement approach. The AFL-CIO saw in labor
law the possibility of re-shaping the UFW into something closer to the standard labor union
mold of the time. Nathan Interview, supra note 51; Cohen Interview, supra note 41.
102. 1975 Levy Interview with Cohen, Nathan, and Gaenslen, supra note 73, at 4-5.
103. LEVY, supra note 32, at 528.
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take that route. Looking at all of the ideas on the table, they decided,
"We'll just load up-we'll ask for everything. We'll ask for the whole
damn thing. 10 4 It was not clear how far their political power could take
them, but they were unwilling to compromise in advance of discovering the
answer.
The initial bill that Jerry Brown introduced, drafted by his Secretary of
Agriculture Rose Bird (later Chief Justice of the California Supreme
Court), was far from the Union's wish list, indeed so far that the UFW
responded with protests around the state. Months of back and forth ensued,
as Cohen negotiated with Brown, Bird, and various attorneys. Eventually,
Cohen succeeded in convincing Brown to change his bill to reflect most of
the UFW's provisions, and the Union gave the measure its full support.
The UFW's cause was aided by some measure of ambivalence about
the bill among the Union's usual opponents, the Teamsters and the
growers. The Teamsters feared that the bill's prohibition on employer-
supported unions could be used to invalidate its sweetheart contracts with
growers who far preferred its lesser demands to those of the UFW. On the
other hand, the Teamsters realized that an agricultural labor relations law
could also work in its favor. In particular, formal elections could legitimate
Teamster contracts in the vegetable fields that had been the subject of
fierce and continuous battles with the UFW.'15
For the growers' part, most put their considerable clout to work to
defeat the UFW-supported bill. But some of them, too, had reasons to
support it. Growers had already been limited by California courts in the
degree to which they could retaliate against union supporters, so they had
less to lose than one might think. They wanted an end to the UFW's
outlaw tactics and they hoped that a law would prohibit the secondary
boycotts that had worked so effectively for the Union.10 6 In addition, there
were important ranches where consumer boycotts, rather than direct worker
support for the UFW, were driving the growers' engagement with the
Union. If the law passed, unionization would be decided by a worker vote,
and the vote on those ranches would likely not be in the UFW's favor. As
Cohen himself told Brown during their negotiations, Gallo (owned by one
of Brown's college roommates) was such a ranch. 10 7  Indeed, the Gallo
company became one of the bill's strongest supporters among the growers,
joined by others who thought that an election system was their best bet for
104. Cohen Interview, supra note 41.
105. In the end the Teamsters also won the right to hold on to those contracts until new
elections were held. Wells & Villarejo, supra note 32, at 296. On all of the machinations
between the various unions with an interest in the bill, the UFW, and the governor's office,
see 1975 Levy Interview with Cohen, Nathan, and Gaenslen, supra note 73.
106. Wells & Villarejo, supra note 32, at 303. For a full discussion of the parameters of
secondary pressure eventually permitted under the ALRA, see infra note 115.
107. 1975 Levy Interview with Cohen, Nathan, and Gaenslen, supra note 73.
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avoiding the constant pressure to recognize the UFW under which they had
lived for the previous decade.0 8
Farm labor legislation had some other unlikely backers. Supermarket
owners, who were tired of the UFW's business-disrupting protests, sought
a bill that would ban secondary boycotts and bring customers back to their
doors.10 9 Some county administrators and sheriffs endorsed the bill, hoping
it would free them of the burden of caring for thousands of UFW protesters
in their jails as they had the previous summer.1 ° The backing of this range
of usually conservative forces eventually would make it easier for
legislators who might otherwise have opposed the bill to vote in favor of it.
There were five other proposals for governing agricultural labor
relations in the California legislature in 1975.11 To avoid a showdown in
the Assembly Labor Relations Committee, Brown made the compromises
necessary to win endorsements from enough key players (including grower
representatives and conservative legislators) that his version was the one
guaranteed to emerge onto the floor. 1 2 Busloads of UFW members and
volunteers lobbied in Sacramento. Meanwhile, Cohen worked behind the
scenes, negotiating with Brown and Bird to make the final legislation as
favorable to the farm workers as possible. Once the bill reached the floor,
rural legislators proposed last minute amendments-for example, a ban on
strikes during harvest-time--that would have seriously harmed the UFW's
cause. The bill amendments were defeated."13  In a special legislative
session called by Brown at Chavez's urging, the bill passed the Senate
thirty-one to seven and, three weeks later, the Assembly by a vote of sixty-
four to ten.
14
The ALRA as passed offered the UFW a powerful new framework for
organizing. It did not include all of the UFW's proposals. The law
108. Cohen, Brown, and former UFW staff LeRoy Chatfield generated a list of the bill's
pro-grower features, which Brown used to sell the ALRA to growers: the presence of a "no
union" option on the ballot; a prohibition on strikes to demand that the grower recognize the
union; giving up the secondary boycott at delivery doors; and the "industrial unit,"
organizing all workers on a ranch into one bargaining unit rather than a series of sub-
divisions by task (arguably advantageous because it protected the grower from serial strikes
and disruptions from different units at different times). 1975 Levy Interview with Cohen,
Nathan, and Gaenslen, supra note 73.
109. LEVY, supra note 32, at 531; Wells & Villarejo, supra note 32, at 9; Cohen
Interview, supra note 41.
110. LEVY, supra note 32, at 531; Cohen Interview, supra note 41.
111. MAJKA & MAJKA, supra note 31, at 238.
112. Id. at 238-39.
113. FERRISS & SANDovAL, supra note 32, at 208.
114. MAJKA & MAJKA, supra note 31, at 239. The effect of the special legislative section
was to permit the law to go into effect in the summer of 1975, rather than waiting for
January of 1976. Id. The UFW wanted the earlier date so that long-time strikers on the
Gallo ranch would qualify to vote in an election under the ALRA "pre-existing strikers"
rule. Cohen Interview, supra note 41.
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allowed the Teamsters to hold onto its contracts until elections were held,
and it banned picketing to enforce a secondary boycott by a union that had
not yet been elected to represent the workers in question.115  Nonetheless,
the UFW's political clout and Cohen's negotiating acumen were clearly
reflected in the bill signed by Brown. Brown would later claim it as "[t]he
greatest accomplishment of my administration."
' 116
The law began with an unabashed endorsement of the right of farm
workers to organize, with a preamble that explicitly stated the Act's goal as
"guaranteeing justice for all agricultural workers." ' 17 The law itself con-
tained provisions that conventional unions could only dream of. It
guaranteed farm worker unions a seven-day turnaround for secret ballot
elections (compared to the thirty to forty-five days that are standard in the
NLRA context), an essential time frame for such a highly mobile work-
115. Cohen argues that the UFW sacrificed little with regard to its secondary boycott
capacity under the ALRA. As he points out, under the ALRA, unions that had not yet been
elected were still allowed to call for secondary boycotts, to publicize the call through the
media, to carry out "human billboarding," and house meetings, and to distribute literature in
front of a grocery store urging consumers to respect the secondary boycott. An elected
union could add secondary picketing to its repertoire. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 11 54(d)(4)
(West 2005) (setting out limitations on secondary picketing for unions not yet elected as
bargaining representative, but permitting other forms of publicity); CAL. LAB. CODE §
1154.5 (West 2005) (setting out permissible range of secondary boycotts). Given all this,
and that a boycott succeeds or falls on the strength of its broad community base, not its
picket line, Cohen argues that the prohibition on patrolling before grocery store doors was
no great loss. The UFW had also conceded the right to picket supermarket delivery doors to
ask that other workers (such as truck drivers) refuse to do business with boycotted markets,
but in any case, they had not been getting the cooperation of other unions' members at
delivery doors because respecting such a secondary boycott request would have rendered
their unions vulnerable to a lawsuit. Telephone Interview with Jerry Cohen, Former
General Counsel, UFW (Mar. 30, 2005). For a review of the Act's secondary pressure
provisions, see Secondary Boycotts and the Employer's Permissible Response Under the
California Agricultural Labor Relations Act, 29 STAN. L. REv. 277 (1977).
Confused by the dense wording of the secondary boycott section, growers at first
believed that the ALRA had eliminated it entirely. Cohen recalls,
We structured the boycott so that it took the boycott away, and then in these
complicated paragraphs gave it back. So that the grower organ, The Packer,
wrote this thing congratulating Brown for banning the secondary boycott. And
then after the damn thing passed, it was like, "Whoops! We're sorry. We're
wrong."
Cohen Interview, supra note 41. See also Tracy E. Sagle, The ALRB-Twenty Years Later,
8 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REv., 139, 153 (1998) (noting graver confusion); "Secondary
Boycott Not Outlawed," THE PACKER, May 31, 1975 (editorial by grower newspaper
admitting it had misunderstood the ALRA to prohibit most secondary boycotts).
116. Philip Martin, Promise Unfulfilled: Why Didn't Collective Bargaining Transform
California's Farm Labor Market? (Ctr. for Immigration Studies Backgrounder, 2004), at 2,
http://www.cis.org/articles/2004/backI 04.html.
117. 1975 CAL. STAT. AND AMENDMENTS TO THE CODE, 3d Extraordinary Sess., c. 1, § 1,
p.40 13.
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force and one that severely limited a grower's ability to run an extended
anti-union campaign; where a strike was in progress the turnaround was
only forty-eight hours." 8 It created more liberal rules for when strikers
could vote in elections" 9 and gave workers much stronger remedies for
employer violations than the NLRA, including, the "make-whole" remedy,
through which a grower who had failed to bargain with the union in good
faith could be required to pay workers the difference between their current
wage and what the contract rate presumably would have been after good
faith bargaining. This remedy has no corollary in the NLRA. It also
established a right to "industrial" bargaining units that grouped workers
doing different jobs on the same ranch together for organizing purposes, a
configuration that the UFW had favored. 20
On top of these legislative provisions, the UFW was able to make the
law more advantageous by using its political clout to guide the choice of
members for the first Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB),
resulting in a pro-UFW super-majority of four to one. As it drafted
regulations for the ALRA's implementation, that board made key additions
to the law, including giving the Union the right to a list of the names and
addresses of the workers at each ranch they were organizing (referred to as
"Excelsior lists," after the NLRB case that gave rise to the right under the
NLRA), putting symbols on the ballots so that farm workers who could not
read and write would be able to put their mark next to the UFW's easily-
118. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1156.3(a) (West 2005). Elections had to take place during peak
season and could begin as soon as the grower's workforce reached 50% of peak numbers.
CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1156.3(a)(1) (West 2005). This was to prevent fewer (but more
powerful) year-round workers from making the decision about unionization for migrants.
119. In both the ALRA and the NLRA, workers on strike to protest their employer's
unfair labor practices ("unfair labor practice strikers") are permitted to vote in any election
at the workplace, but there are limitations on the voting rights of workers who have gone on
strike to demand a raise, increased benefits, or a better contract ("economic strikers"). The
NLRA limits all economic strikers to voting in elections that occur within twelve months of
the commencement of the strike (unfair labor practice strikers are not limited in this way).
W Wilton Wood, Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 1675 (1960). By contrast, the ALRA only disqualifies
economic strikers after twelve months if they have been permanently replaced. CAL. LAB.
CODE § 1157 (West 2005). Significantly, for strikes initiated within 18 months prior to the
ALRA's effective date, the ALRA permitted the ALRB to open elections to workers who
had been on strike for economic reasons for up to three years prior to the ALRA's effective
date. Id.
120. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1140-1166 (West 1960). The UFW favored industrial units
(rather than so-called "craft" units, which would have grouped workers by the job they did)
because they grouped less powerful migrant workers with more powerful classes of workers
such as irrigators and tractor-drivers, thus increasing migrants' chances of moving up to
better jobs and permitting the UFW to coordinate bargaining and, if necessary, strikes across
a ranch. For further comparisons of the ALRA and the NLRA, see MARTIN, supra note 32,
at 94-95; Wells & Villarejo, supra note 32, at 293-97; Maria L. Ontiveros, Lessons from
the Fields: Female Farmworkers and the Law, 55 ME. L. REv. 157, 175-79 (2003); Sagle,
supra note 115, at 139.
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recognizable black eagle, and creating access rules that guaranteed at least
two organizers the right to speak freely with workers in the fields at defined
times during the work day. The UFW had wanted these provisions from
the beginning but felt it would be unable to get the law passed with them
included. When the ink dried on the final rules, California could boast only
the second pro-organizing farm labor law in the country (the first being the
Hawaii Employment Relations Act, 121 passed in 1945 before Hawaii was
part of the United States), one that set a gold standard for any other states
that cared to follow.
122
C. Legal Work in the Wake of the ALRA
For all of its beauty on paper, the UFW recognized that the ALRA
would mean nothing unless the Union could generate enough pressure to
make it a real tool for farm workers. The UFW had a bare three months
between when the law passed and when it went into effect to completely
revamp its organizing effort. Meeting the challenge required intensive
teamwork between the UFW's legal and organizing departments, the sort of
tight coordination that was only possible because of the years of
collaboration that preceded it.
In the legal department, a group of lawyers who had prided
themselves on their expertise in civil rights law and the battle against
injunctions but had little or no experience representing conventional unions
suddenly found nothing but a few pages on the calendar between
themselves and full-fledged labor law practice. Cohen split the legal
department in two, one half to manage ongoing litigation, the other-under
the direction of Sandy Nathan-to work on ALRA matters. The
department quickly rose to its peak of seventeen lawyers, forty-four
paralegals, and a large number of volunteer attorneys playing supporting
roles. Nathan set law students to work creating a hornbook on NLRB
121. Hawaii Employment Relations Act, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 377 (LexisNexis
2004). The Hawaii Employment Relations Act covers almost all workers excluded from the
NLRA, including (but not limited to) agricultural workers. HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 377-
1(3) (LexisNexis 2004).
122. Cohen notes with amusement the questions he now gets about his tactics in creating
the law.
That law came from ten years of organizing, boycotting, striking, people going
to jail. That's where the law came from. You know I get. . . some of these
folks doing doctoral pieces. "How did you negotiate the law?" You'd have to
be an idiot not to get that law. That law was the result of ten years of pressure.
Now, we played it out right, you know. We played what hand we were dealt to
get what we needed. But that is the product of all the work that those folks did
and Cesar ... was crucial in organizing that.
Cohen Interview, supra note 41.
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practice, which the lawyers studied avidly.
In the Union as a whole, organizers were being called back to
California from the boycott and deployed in the fields to prepare workers
for elections and tell them about their new-found rights. Lawyers,
organizers and paralegals strategized on how to approach organizing under
this new system. One of the UFW's most important goals for the summer
of 1975 was to communicate to farm workers that the ALRA's protections
truly shifted the age-old power relationships on the ranch. The Union had
"to make the law real in people's experience as something that stood
between them and the grower."1 23  Later, once the ALRB opened, the
Union would seek to "maneuver the board into demonstrating its power in
relation to the growers."' 24 But in the interim, the onus was on UFW
organizers and lawyers, who fanned out across the state to talk with
workers about their new rights under the law. As they went into the fields,
they discovered that the growers were flouting the ALRA's rules about
organizers' rights to enter the fields to talk with workers, and the Teamsters
were resisting being confined by any legal restrictions at all. The jungle
would not so easily be tamed by the proclamation of a law to govern it.
To turn a paper law into a real one, the UFW had to work with the
new agency created by the ALRA. The ALRB opened its doors on
September 2, 1975. On the surface, it looked to be an ideal partner for the
UFW. After all, four of five initial board appointments had reason to favor
farm worker interests over growers (indeed, one was former lead UFW
staffer LeRoy Chatfield, at the UFW's explicit request), and Brown's pro-
UFW views were well known to the general counsel he appointed, Walter
Kintz. 125
Matters on the ground, however, proved considerably less simple.
Few ALRB staff spoke Spanish, and according to observers at the time-
including a fellow board attorney-many treated farm workers with
suspicion or outright distaste. 26  The new agency was at once utterly
disorganized and instantly bureaucratic. As former board attorney Ellen
123. Ganz Interview, supra note 39.
124. See also Wells & Villarejo, supra note 32, at 305 (quoting Cohen: "For farm
workers to have faith in the law, you have to show them that they can demand
enforcement.").
125. Kintz, an NLRB attorney, was favored by the growers for the job. Cohen attributes
Brown's appointment of him to pressure generated by the growers after they discovered
they had been duped into thinking that the ALRA banned the secondary boycott. "Once the
growers had good lawyers read this bill, they became unhinged," Cohen recalls. "And so
they raised holy hell and ... they were able to convince [Brown]" to appoint Kintz. 1993
Levy Interview with Cohen, supra note 64.
126. Nathan Interview, supra note 51; Jacques Levy Interview with Ellen Greenstone,
former Staff Attorney, ALRB (Sept. 25, 1975) (cited with Ms. Greenstone's permission)
[hereinafter 1975 Levy Interview with Greenstone].
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Greenstone recalls, "the first thing they taught us at orientation was how to
fill out an expense report."127 Many of the ALRB staff (including Kintz)
were brought in from the NLRB, and were steeped in its rules and
accustomed to its glacial pace, which was ill-suited to a new law requiring
that elections be held days-not months-after workers filed a petition.
More than a hundred UFW members were waiting the morning that the
board opened to file election petitions from twenty-one different ranches,
having spent the previous night in a vigil outside the ALRB office in
Salinas.2 ' Many others followed on their heels. The board threatened that
processing scores of elections would take months and it sat on hundreds of
unfair labor practice petitions the UFW subsequently filed to protest
workers fired for their union support.
Meanwhile, growers continued to resist the law with impunity. Three
weeks after the ALRB opened for business, Sandy Nathan, the UFW's lead
attorney for ALRA matters, commented: "The growers are really lawless
at this point. To them it's perfectly permissible to disregard the law and to
do everything they can to subvert it. And the board is not recognizing that.
. . They're just looking at it that everybody is a good faith participant."
Responding to growers' demands, board staff regularly excluded workers
from pre-election conferences; when the board finally responded to UFW
pressure to include them, it did so without translation (or with an offer to
translate only the "important stuff," leading Sandy Nathan to suggest that
they conduct the conference in Spanish and "translate the important stuff
into English for the employer"). 29 The board regularly acceded to grower
requests that elections be held on grower property and accommodated
growers' unsubstantiaied claims that the workforce was not yet at peak.
Most aggravating, Kintz proved indifferent to the UFW's complaints and
its sense of urgency. 3°
The UFW had spent the summer promising workers that the new law
would protect them, and with every firing that went unaddressed, every
election petition that languished in the ALRB's hands, every organizer
denied access, that promise receded.' 3' The stakes were high, and the
127. Greenstone Interview, supra note 53.
128. Interview by Jacques Levy with Sandy Nathan in the Jacques E. Levy Research
Collection on Cesar Chavez, Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Rare Book
and Manuscript Library (Sept. 24, 1975) [hereinafter 1975 Levy Interview with Nathan].
129. Id.
130. This description of the ALRA's early days is drawn from both Jacques Levy's
interviews with UFW attorney Sandy Nathan and ALRB attorney Ellen Greenstone in
September of 1975, less than a month after the ALRB opened, and from my interviews with
Greenstone, Nathan and Cohen.
131. See Posting of Alberto Escalante (Dec. 26, 2004), Documentation Project,
http://www.farmworkermovement.org (follow "Discussion Archive" link, then "December,
2004" link, then scroll to page 168) ("And while you're trying to tell the farm workers to not
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Union responded in its customary style. As Nathan recalls, "We would
raise hell .... Everything was a fight! Everything! 1 32 As before, lawyers
and organizers worked closely together. As former lead organizer Ganz
recalls, "[S]ometimes it would be a sit in, and sometimes it would be a
motion"; 133 either way, the Union sought to influence the development of
board policy and practice. "Every step of every election procedure was
contested, fought over-the order in which the regional offices accepted
petitions, the scheduling of elections, election rules, worker education, pre-
election conference proceedings, unfair labor practice processing, and
throwing elections out. The whole process was political and subject to
pressure."'13 4 The Union carried out sit-ins at ALRB regional offices and in
Governor Brown's office, brought workers to protest at pre-election
conferences from which the board had excluded them, and called the
ALRB incessantly to prod it to prioritize the cases where speed was of the
essence and to deal with the rest expeditiously. Cohen called for Kintz's
resignation at the first ALRB election hearing, and the UFW ratcheted up
the pressure when he refused to step down.'35
By November 1975, Brown, at first a bystander to the chaos,
responded to the Union's demands by creating a task force of experienced
outside attorneys to train board staff and prosecute growers themselves.
The ALRB began working more effectively to enforce the new law.
136
After the task force was created, the UFW was often successful in drafting
ALRB officials on the ground to illustrate the new landscape of power
under the ALRA. As Ganz recalls, "the law said that board agents were
supposed to advise workers of their rights, and so forth. Well, we insisted
that the board agents go out to the ranch, get rid of the foremen and
supervisors, have a meeting with the workers, and explain what their rights
worry about being fired ... they've just seen a UFW organizer being hauled off to jail for
trespassing?").
132. 1975 Levy Interview with Nathan, supra note 128; 1975 Levy Interview with
Greenstone, supra note 126. "Farm workers' history with laws are that they are on the
books and they don't get enforced ... and the trick was to let people know... this was one
law that... was going to be enforced." Id. Cohen later noted: "Well, the Democratic
administration [of Brown] wouldn't have enforced the law without pressure, and we gave
'em pressure .... It was a war until Brown understood we were damn serious about it."
1993 Levy Interview with Cohen, supra note 64.
133. Ganz Interview, supra note 39.
134. Wells & Villarejo, supra note 32, at 305 (quoting Ganz).
135. Kintz resigned in the winter of 1975-76. MAJKA & MAJKA, supra note 31, at 245.
136. 1975 Levy Interviews with Nathan, supra note 128; Cohen Interview, supra note
41; Greenstone Interview, supra note 53. Sam Cohen was appointed to lead the task force;
other attorneys included pro-farm worker champions such as CRLA attorney Maurice "Mo"
Jourdane. Cohen: "We were constantly pressuring them and that's how we got the task
force. That's how we got enforcement of the law." 1993 Levy Interview with Cohen, supra
note 64.
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were." Each time ALRB agents ordered a foreman to leave a meeting or
arrived to tell workers about their rights was a small victory on the road to
UFW representation.137 Elections soared, the board moved quickly on the
representation petitions that workers filed, and victories began to pile up.
By the UFW's contemporaneous tally, a staggering 45,915 farm workers
voted in 382 elections during the first five months after the ALRA's
passage: an average of seventy-six elections per month. 1
38
These early, exhausting, euphoric months ground to an unexpected
halt when the ALRB closed its doors on February 6, 1976. Confronted
with a tidal wave of elections, it had run through its annual budget in less
than half a year. For the next eight months the ALRB remained closed, as
growers (stunned by the over 90% level of union victory in the early
elections) and Teamsters (who lost more often to the UFW than they had
anticipated) pressured legislators to pass amendments to the legislation
before it granted the agency further funding. Lawmakers refused to amend
the ALRA, but nor could they muster the two-thirds majority required to
pass an emergency appropriation. In the meantime, several pro-UFW
members of the ALRB resigned. 3 9 During this time, the UFW mounted a
large-scale effort to win Proposition 14, which would have guaranteed the
ALRB permanent funding and required voters statewide to ratify any
proposed changes to the ALRA, thus securing the board a future
independent of the state budget process. The UFW spent more than a
million dollars on the initiative, but growers poured $2 million into a
campaign to defeat it, and it lost in the fall of 1976 by a considerable
margin.140 In the process, however, the UFW succeeded in pressuring
legislators to authorize the budget that the ALRA needed to resume
functioning.
14 1
When the ALRB reopened on December 1, 1976, the volume of
elections had fallen considerably, although it was still impressive. Over
150 elections took place in each of the following two years, with over
9,000 farm workers voting per year. The UFW won 55% of those
137. Jerry Cohen recalls Mo Jourdane-in his task force role as an ALRB agent-
standing up on the bus carrying workers to fields owned by anti-union stalwart Bruce
Church and telling the workers they had the right to organize under the ALRA. "This," he
observes, "was mighty powerful medicine." 1993 Levy Interview with Cohen, supra note
64.
138. "United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO: Elections Statistical Tally Up to and
Including February 6, 1976: Statewide Results," Jacques Levy Research Collection on
Cesar Chavez, Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Rare Book Library and
Manuscript Library, Box 29, Folder 563, File 31.
139. Proposed amendments included elimination of the access rule, an extension of the
election period from 7 to 21 days, and lower penalties for growers who violated the law.
MAJKA & MAjKA, supra note 31, at 244-45.
140. FERRISS & SANDOVAL, supra note 32, at 208.
141. Wells & Villarejo, supra note 32, at 304.
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elections; the Teamsters won 32%.142 By January 1978, the UFW had
brought 25,000 new workers under contract through ALRA procedures and
represented two or three times that number on ranches where growers were
resisting negotiating contracts. 143  The benefits for farm workers were
immediate: wages rose by 30% to 50%, and many received health and
pension benefits for the first time in their lives. 144 At its height two years
later, the UFW had over 50,000 members under contract and as many as
50,000 more "affiliated" farm workers. 45  The Union's reputation
stretched across the country and indeed the globe.
D. The Unraveling
The ALRA offered the UFW a remarkable opportunity, and the UFW
seized it and held on. And yet within a decade of the ALRA's passage, the
UFW was all but dormant, as was the ALRB.146 Many factors contributed
to this decline. On all fronts during the 1980s, organizing became more
difficult. An influx of undocumented workers increased competition and
made raising wages harder. 14 Meanwhile, growers fought back against the
advantages the ALRA gave farm workers. They used ALRB appeals to
delay decisions on elections, and built support in Sacramento for their
efforts to re-shape the political landscape that had brought the ALRA into
being. 4  But the UFW had faced political opposition, intense labor
competition, and grower resistance before, and triumphed. Internal
changes in the UFW seem to have played the critical role in its inability to
142. Id. at 301.
143. Theo J. Majka & Linda C. Majka, Decline of the Farm Labor Movement in
California: Organizational Crisis and Political Change, 19 CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY 3, 14-15
(1992) [hereinafter Majka & Majka, Decline of the Farm Labor Movement].
144. Martin, supra note 116, at 2.
145. Exact numbers on UFW membership are very hard to obtain. In 1981, the UFW
was claiming 108,000 members, while admitting that number represented "every worker
who has spent 'one hour to one year' working for a grower under a union contract." Wayne
King, Chavez Faces Internal and External Struggles, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1981, at 1.
Scholars and close observers seem to concur that the Union had from 50,000 to 70,000
workers at its peak in the early 1980s. MAjKA & MAJKA, supra note 31, at 251; MARTIN,
supra note 32, at 91; Wells & Villarejo, supra note 32, at 303.
146. Jennifer Scholz, Duke's ALRB: The Farmer's Friend, CAL. J., Aug. 1987, at 375;
Diane Wagner, Seeds of Change at the ALRB, CAL. LAW., March 1987, at 22. See also
Majka & Majka, Decline of the Farm Labor Movement, supra note 143, at 23-28; Wells &
Villarejo, supra note 32, at 315 (both discussing ALRA changes under California's
Republican governors).
147. See PHILIP L. MARTIN, PROMISE UNFULFILLED: UNIONS, IMMIGRATION, & THE FARM
WORKERS (2003), especially Chapter 8; DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, ET AL., BEYOND SMOKE AND
MIRRORS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (2003), especially
chapters 5 and 6.
148. See sources cited supra note 146.
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respond effectively to this round of challenges.'49
Beginning in the mid-1970s, Chavez-who was always known for the
close eye he kept on even the smallest administrative details of the
management of the UFW-began to show signs of intensifying concern
that his control over the Union was threatened. Others have explored this
turbulent period in the UFW's history in greater depth. 150 For the purposes
of this Article, a few factors seem particularly relevant. In 1977, the
Teamsters withdrew from farm worker organizing as part of the settlement
of the long-running anti-trust lawsuit brought by the UFW. The Teamsters'
presence had been a thorn in the Union's side but also a goad to continual
organizing.' 5 ' With the threat of competition in the fields gone, Chavez
turned inward. He required union staff to participate in a psychological
game run by the cult-like group Synanon to hash out internal problems, led
the union into a retreat from the critical work of field organizing, and
funneled increasing amounts of the UFW's money from the fields into
direct mail and politics.
Among other concerns, Chavez focused on what he feared were two
independent power bases developing within the union: the legal depart-
ment (located in Salinas rather than at union headquarters in La Paz), which
had become increasingly central to the UFW's organizing strategy after the
passage of the ALRA; and Salinas-based vegetable workers organized
through ALRA procedures by Ganz and Govea among others. Those
workers' independence and strength rendered them more confident of their
ability to strike for better pay and conditions and therefore less reliant on
the social movement strategies that Chavez had to offer than the Union's
traditional mainstay, grape workers, who needed considerable outside
support (as with the boycott) to prevail against growers.'52 The thousands
of new workers brought under UFW contracts through ALRA procedures
heightened Chavez's concerns as well. Managing the large number of
workers organized under the new law and administering the contracts the
Union had negotiated required more sophisticated administrative systems
than the UFW had. But to move in that direction, with an increased focus
on contract administration and institutionalization, would have meant
149. Majka & Majka, Decline of the Farm Labor Movement, supra note 143, at 16-23;
Wells & Villarejo, supra note 32, at 300-08.
150. See Frank Bardacke, Cesar's Ghost. The Decline & Fall of the UFW, THE NATION,
July 26, 1993, at 130; Michael Yates, A Union Is Not a "Movement", THE NATION, Nov. 19,
1977, at 518; Majka & Majka, Decline of the Farm Labor Movement, supra note 143; Wells
& Villarejo, supra note 32.
151. Wells & Villarejo, supra note 32, at 305-06.
152. Cohen Interview, supra note 41; Ganz Interview, supra note 39; E-mail from Doug
Adair (June 2, 2004), Documentation Project, http://www.farmworkermovement.org (follow
"Discussion Archive" link, then "June, 2004" link, then scroll to page 20); Wells &
Villarejo, supra note 32, at 307.
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acknowledging a shift in the UFW's identity from a social movement to a
union, something that Chavez in particular was loath to do.'53
Matters came to a head when Cohen, Ganz and Govea supported a call
by organizers and paralegals that they be paid a regular salary, a move
away from the "volunteer stipend" system that applied to most field and
service staff and toward a more institutionalized system. The lawyers also
asked for an increase in their base monthly salary from $600 to $1000.
Disagreeing on both fronts, Chavez insisted that the UFW needed to go in
the opposite direction, returning to its all-volunteer movement roots. He
focused on the lawyers' request. In mid-1978, he proposed to the
Executive Board that it begin this process by de-funding the UFW's
lawyers and requiring that they participate in the volunteer system like
most other staff.1 54 The board split along generational lines, with younger
members opposed to Chavez's proposal (such as Ganz, Govea, and Eliseo
Medina) losing to a slim majority of older UFW leaders. Stripped of their
income, most of the lawyers left in 1978 and 1979.' During the same
153. See also Cohen Interview, supra note 4 1; Email from Tom Dalzell (June 15, 2004),
Documentation Project, http://www.farmworkermovement.org (follow "Discussion
Archive" Link, then "June, 2004" link, then scroll to page 153).
154. The proposal also involved moving the lawyers from Salinas, where most were
stationed, to the Union's rural headquarters in La Paz. Chavez asked Cohen to stay on, with
full pay, and train a new group of lawyers who would work from La Paz as volunteers;
Cohen, considerably less sanguine about the fungibility of legal talent than Chavez, refused.
Instead he agreed to remain for eighteen months in a limited capacity to negotiate contracts
and argue a pending case before the Supreme Court. Cohen Interview, supra note 41.
Although one interpretation of this turn of events might be that Chavez's proposal
represented the erupting of some long-simmering resentment of the Union's lawyers, people
who were close to him at the time say that it appeared to be a more immediate response to
Chavez's growing fears that some lead organizers were undermining his work, a way of re-
asserting his control and cutting off possible legal support for their efforts, than a
fundamental belief that the legal work was in tension with the organizing. Chavez had
occasionally expressed concern to Cohen about the level of resources that the legal
department consumed, but this was inevitably coupled with his recognition of the power that
lawyers helped the UFW to build. Cohen Interview, supra note 41; Ganz Interview, supra
note 39.
155. The UFW operated with a considerably smaller legal department in the wake of
Cohen's departure, with a few lawyers working from La Paz for the Union's then-standard
$ 10/week plus room, board, a small clothing allowance and the repayment of school loans.
Their efforts were supplemented by outside representation and pro-bono assistance. They
continued to do ALRB cases, and also defended the UFW when it was sued by growers or
its own members. Gottlieb Interview, supra note 45. See also E-mails from Ellen Eggers
(May 24, 2004), Documentation Project, http://www.farmworkermovement.org (follow
"Discussion Archive" link, then "May, 2004" link, then scroll to pages 85 and 87)
(discussing changes under new legal department and legal strategies); E-mail from Ellen
Eggers (June 2, 2004), Documentation Project, http://www.farmworkermovement.org
(follow "Discussion Archive" link, then "June, 2004" link, then scroll to page 27)
(discussing changes under new legal department and legal strategies). The need for paid
representation eventually reasserted itself, however, and for many years now the UFW has
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period, Chavez put down attempts by workers to run their own candidates
for the Union's executive board, and he froze out or fired almost all of his
most experienced staff, including Ganz, Govea, Medina, and many other
key organizers. Cohen stayed in a limited capacity until late 1980, when he
too departed. The impact of these changes on the UFW's organizing
capacity was immediate. Before any of the transformation of immigration
patterns or the political landscape that would mark the 1980s, the ALRB
witnessed a steep drop in elections and union election victories starting in
fiscal year 1978-1979.156
Chavez ultimately succeeded in retaining control of the UFW, but at a
price. Over the course of the following decade, the Union organized few
new workers, and many of its contracts expired unattended. With the 1982
election of Republican Governor George Deukmejian, growers succeeded
in changing the state-wide political landscape. 5 7  Deukmejian appointed
David Stirling, a former Republican assemblyman, as General Counsel of
the NLRB. Stirling proved so hostile to union interests that he was labeled
"the farmer's friend."'' 8 The UFW was so angered by the change in the
been represented by its current General Counsel, Marcos Camacho, who serves the union
through his private firm. Camacho is the graduate of a project that Chavez initiated in
1972, through which the UFW put promising community members into a legal
apprenticeship program, after which they were admitted to the practice of law (without ever
having attended law school) once they passed the California Bar exam. In 1976, Tom
Dalzell became the first UFW-sponsored candidate to pass the bar and enter practice
through this program. Telephone Interview with Tom Dalzell, Former Staff Attorney, UFW
(June 13, 2005) [hereinafter Dalzell Interview]. See generally Fred Alvarez, Apprentices
Take Law Into Their Own Hands, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2004, at BI (discussing the
apprenticeship program and the UFW's experience with it).
156. Wells & Villarejo, supra note 32, at 302 ("In sum, what is most striking about the
ALRA election data is the sharp drop in election activity and union wins after 1977-78
(with the exception of the 1980 upswing), coupled with a rise in the proportion of
decertification and "no union"-won elections."). Wells and Villarejo go on to remark that
the 1977-78 decline came at a time "when political climate, growers' strategies, and labor
market conditions were all favorable" to the UFW. Id. at 304. "Sharp drops in the number
of elections held, votes cast, and union-won elections after that point coincided with a shift
in union policy that interrupted the forms of pressure exertion that had proved so effective."
Id. See also id. at 16-17.
157. Under Deukmejian and then (to a somewhat lesser extent) his Republican successor
Pete Wilson, ALRB members who had seen the law as a tool to encourage farm worker
organizing were replaced with others who supported growers. Majka & Majka, Power,
Insurgency and State Intervention, supra note 32, at 220-21; Wells & Villarejo, supra note
32, at 318. Many pro-worker ALRB staff resigned: within eighteen months of Stirling's
appointment, forty-two of 107 staff members departed. Scholz, supra note 146, at 376. The
board began to dismiss a large percentage of unfair labor practice charges filed by the Union
against growers. Wells & Villarejo, supra note 32, at 310. By this time, however, the UFW
had largely withdrawn from the fields, and it is unclear that the UFW would have been in a
position to take advantage of the ALRB's protections even had the agency been operating at
full capacity.
158. Scholz, supra note 146.
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ALRB's focus and strategy that in 1986-the year that Deukmejian
appointees came to control a majority of seats on the ALRB-it put its
political weight behind an unsuccessful effort to de-fund the agency it had
worked so hard to bring into being a mere decade before. 5 9 At the time of
Chavez's death in 1993, the Union had between 5,000 and 10,000
members. 160 In the mid-1990s and early 2000s, the UFW began to regain
some vigor under the leadership of Arturo Rodriguez, Chavez's son-in-law.
The Union received renewed attention and support from the AFL-CIO for
its campaign to organize strawberry workers after John Sweeney's election
in 1995, although that effort did not prove successful on a large scale.
161
Despite some noteworthy legislative victories, the venerable and embattled
UFW has not yet managed to regain the public prominence or the level of
worker representation it enjoyed in its heyday.
62
III. ANALYSIS OF A COLLABORATION
What made the UFW legal strategy so successful? And what insights
does the broad sweep of the UFW's experience both outside a formal
governing law and within one suggest about what lawyers can offer unions
and about the opportunities and obstacles law creates for a labor
movement?
As the UFW's story so amply illustrates, good lawyers for labor (or
for any movement) have one consistent touchstone: the question "what can
legal strategies do to help the union win organizing victories"? Although
the question is a constant, the answer varies tremendously with context. A
labor movement has very different opportunities to use the law to advance
its goals depending on the legal, political, economic and social environ-
ment in which it operates. Important factors include the laws that explicitly
or potentially govern its conduct or its opponents', the courts through
which its claims are channeled and the judges before whom they are heard,
and the receptivity of politicians and government officials at a range of
levels to its cause, among others. At the same time, labor's capacity to take
advantage of opportunities to use law to build union power depends on the
159. Id. at 376; Wagner, supra note 146, at 23.
160. Wells & Villarejo, supra note 32, at 303.
161. MARTIN, PROMISE UNFULFILLED, supra note 147, at 79-80; ERIC SCHLOSSER,
REEFER MADNESS: SEX, DRUGS, AND CHEAP LABOR IN THE AMERICAN BLACK MARKET 103-
104 (2003). See generally David Bacon's articles on the UFW strawberry campaign and
photographs of strawberry workers collected on his website, http://dbacon.igc.org/
Farm Work/farmwork.htm.
162. The UFW in 2001 and 2002 succeeded in getting two new pro-farmworker bills
signed into law in California. One imposed high penalties on growers and contractors who
fail to pay farm workers legal wages. The other created a pilot program of first-contract
mediation for agricultural workers and their unions.
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presence of a particular type of lawyer (and a particular type of union
leader) and can be dramatically enhanced by a way of structuring the
relationship between law and organizing that puts the power-building
question, rather than the more common question of "how can we as lawyers
win a legal victory," at center stage.
A. Legal Strategies in the Jungle
A key contextual change over time in the UFW's story is of course
first the lack, and then the emergence, of a governing law. It is important
to begin this analysis, however, by challenging the concept of the "law of
the jungle," a phrase used frequently by Cohen in discussing the pre-ALRA
period and later by AFL-CIO leaders looking back longingly to the time
before they became ensnared in the NLRA. "Law of the jungle" implies
that at the time in question there is no law at all, that disputes are settled by
the brute strength of the powerful and the wiliness of those who might at
first glance seem weak. Government, legal rules, and courts all are absent
in such an account.
Despite this description, before the UFW was governed by the ALRA
it operated in a world where law was very much present, either as a weapon
deployed against the Union or as a resource that it came to recognize and of
which it took advantage. The state was already an active participant in the
struggle between growers and farm workers, and long had been.
Employers demanded that the courts issue injunctions against picketers,
restrict organizers' access to the fields, and evict striking farm workers
from labor camps, all for violations of criminal and property law. They
called on the police to enforce those orders. Both were consistently
responsive. Growers used immigration policy as a tool of labor market
control, obtaining extra workers through the bracero program as long as it
lasted and through various other temporary immigration programs after
that, and hiring undocumented immigrants as strikebreakers with full
confidence that the state would not enforce the law against their presence.
For its part, in the period before the ALRA, the UFW drew on a
variety of laws-and on its own capacity to pressure those who made and
enforced the law-to build the Union's power. During that time, the UFW
won the right to represent workers by generating so much pressure that a
grower would agree to a union contract in order to be able to once again
harvest and sell its product without interference. The most useful legal
work was that which made the greatest contribution to the effort to
persuade the grower to give in. Constitutional law, and the very influential
example of the then ongoing civil rights movement in using constitutional
law to facilitate protest and generate public support, proved critical to the
UFW's ability to sustain its strikes, pickets, and marches. It used tort law,
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wage and hour law, and the minimalist California Labor Code to pepper
growers with lawsuits designed both to gain redress for workers and to
pressure employers to agree to union representation. It was increasingly
creative in its search for new legal theories (grounded in civil rights law,
antitrust, and other claims) that could stymie the grower-Teamster
collaboration. In ways that were controversial even at the time (and seem
more so in retrospect), it demanded that the INS enforce immigration law
by hauling undocumented workers out of the fields, calling in reports on
workers in particular ranches, publishing a long report on "Illegal Alien
Farm Labor Activity in California and Arizona" with detailed affidavits
and ranch-by-ranch statistics documenting the INS's failure to act in the
face of known undocumented workers in the fields,'63 and eventually going
so far as to set up its own patrol (the "wet line") in Arizona when it felt that
the government was doing an inadequate job of policing the border.
164
The so-called "law of the jungle" phase, then, was for the UFW not so
much about operation in an ungoverned state of nature as it was about
maneuvering to achieve the Union's goals through creative use of a wide
range of laws, legal fora, and potential state interventions. This sometimes
happened directly (as when the constitutional claims were successful in
permitting picketing), but more often indirectly, as when depositions gave
the union access to information it needed about pickets, or when a legal
defeat such as a judge's refusal to mandate release of information about
pesticides became a platform for the union to "raise an issue" and tell its
story to the public, or when the sheer weight of the antitrust litigation led to
the Teamsters' agreeing to a pact in exchange for its dismissal.
B. The Structure of the Relationship
The UFW's success in integrating law and organizing was not merely
the result of creative legal tactics. The internal relationship between the
Union's organizing staff and its legal department was very important in
facilitating the collaboration, which avoided many of the pitfalls that have
plagued similar efforts.
Although it might intuitively seem that the relationship between legal
and organizing strategies in an effort to achieve social change should be an
easy one-after all, both are important tools in the struggle-it rarely is.
Many a would-be collaboration has foundered on the rocks of tension
163. UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA, ILLEGAL ALIEN FARM LABOR ACTIVITY 1N
CALIFORNIA AND ARIZONA, in the Jacques E. Levy Research Collection on Cesar Chavez,
Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Box
21 Folder 444; Box 29, Folder 568.
164. Jeff Coplon, Cesar Chavez's Fall from Grace, Part 11, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Aug.
21, 1984, at 18; FERRISS & SANDOVAL, supra note 32, at 244.
LAW, LAWYERS, AND LABOR
between lawyers and organizers about goals, methods, and leadership,
among other issues. A substantial literature lays out the perils. Concern
about lawyer domination is a recurring theme. Scholars and activists alike
offer a panoply of examples where a lawyer's well-intentioned intervention
in an ongoing organizing battle had the effect of de-mobilizing participants,
turning the attorney into the "expert" and focusing the group's energy on a
court case and its outcome rather than on the need to build power through
collective action.
165
Much of the concern about lawyer domination among scholars and
activists arises in settings where the organizing effort is relatively young or
weak. In such a situation, there is a heightened danger that a lawyer will be
seen as the leader and that legal strategies will overtake collective ones.
166
In this regard, it is important that Cohen came to the UFW five years into
its history, after it had already become a broad movement with a clearly
defined organizing strategy, a highly visible charismatic leader, and several
victories under its belt. In the case of the UFW, the Union's strength and
clarity about its goals at the time it first brought Cohen on staff-and
Chavez's skill at communicating those goals and in teaching Cohen to be
the sort of lawyer who could advance them-proved to be critical elements
of the successful collaboration. Cohen was also not on the Union's
Executive Committee, he did not and could not organize groups of workers,
and he did not seek to limit the Union's tactics or control its approach.
Chavez respected Cohen greatly, but there was no question that Chavez
was in control of the Union.
Another key element of the UFW's success in merging law and
organizing strategies was that legal representation was coordinated and in
large measure provided in-house. The UFW had experimented with
outside lawyers initially and found them wanting. Likewise, its experience
165. GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRES-
SIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992) 11-28; Michael J. Fox, Some Rules for Community Lawyers, 14
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1, 5-7 (1980); Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking:
Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 437-41 (1995) [hereinafter Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking];
Muhammad I. Kenyatta, Community Organizing, Client Involvement, and Poverty Law, 35
MONTHLY REV. 18, 22-23 (1983); William Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers:
Lawyering for the Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 455,
455 (1995); White, supra note 42, at 755-57 and n. 209. See also books and articles on law
and organizing referenced in Loretta Price and Melinda Davis, Seeds of Change: A
Bibliographic Introduction to Law and Organizing, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 615
(2000-2001).
166. Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and
Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L.
REV. 1103, 1141-42 (1992); Ann Southworth, Collective Representation for the
Disadvantaged: Variations in Problems of Accountability, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2449
(1999).
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with a staff lawyer whose role was largely to service members had been a
frustrating one. Once Cohen joined the Union and began to build a legal
department, the UFW's effort to deploy legal strategies to enhance the
UFW's organizing power took off. No longer were the UFW's lawyers
hemmed in by ideas about labor law steeped in the NLRA and its
limitations, by government funding restrictions and by the need to represent
individual farm workers to get around those restrictions, by the mission of
an advocacy group, or by the limitations on time and resources imposed by
pro bono attorney's obligations at an outside firm. They could experiment
with the broad range of answers to the department's central charge, to put
their legal skills to work "to figure out ways of generating the kind of
power that's needed."'
167
Present as they were every day in the Union's small field offices, in
the fields and in local courtrooms, these lawyers became repeat players, at
once experienced with the local legal context and imbued with the feel and
goals of the UFW's everday work. All of these factors made them more
likely to understand what the Union was seeking to achieve and to perceive
where emerging opportunities might lie to use legal strategies to realize
those aims. Equally important, having an in-house legal department gave
the UFW the ability to deploy lawyers very cheaply by contrast with its
opponents, who had to pay for counsel. A UFW staff attorney's annual
salary cost roughly the same as two weeks of lawyer time at the rates that
the Teamsters and growers had to pay private law firms for representation.
While the UFW's opponents' expenses rose with each additional hour their
lawyers worked, the Union's costs were both fixed and low. This effect
was magnified by the incorporation of large quantities of free outside legal
support, from volunteer paralegals and law students to experienced pro
bono attorneys.
This in-house work was governed by a clear understanding about what
the Union's lawyers were there for: to open the field for organizing and to
advance the union's ultimate goal of large-scale farm worker
representation. If a lawsuit worked directly or indirectly to build power in
these ways, it was brought. If it did not, the Union had no interest.
Directed and largely executed by the Union's own full-time lawyers, the
UFW's legal strategy skirted much conflict (common in other scenarios
where lawyers work to support organizing) about lawyers dictating or
dominating or shutting down organizing, and about lawsuits rather than
collective action taking center stage. The UFW's legal department built a
tremendous amount of power for the Union. Together with strikes and the
boycott, it was one of the three legs on which the organizing strategy stood.
But the end goal-building a farm workers' movement and union-was
167. Cohen Interview, supra note 41.
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always clear, and to that end goal, lawyers were a handmaiden.
Further credit for the smooth integration of law and organizing in the
union is due to Chavez's leadership, and to the way the lawyers and the
organizers at the union related to each other. Ganz recalls, "Cesar ... took
the responsibility for making Jerry a respected person in the movement....
And Jerry was clear that Cesar was in charge. On the other hand, Jerry was
never shy about saying what he thought about stuff. And so that kind of set
a tone."' 168 Organizer Jessica Govea concurred,
Cesar ...didn't hide behind Jerry. [He] didn't hide behind-
"Well, we can't do that because of the law, we can't do this
because of the law." Cesar said, "We're figuring out what we
have to do and we happen to have the good fortune to have Jerry
here who can be .. .a part of the creating of this, because he's
got a certain kind of expertise that's important.
169
In turn, Cohen's attitude toward organizers facilitated the relationship.
Govea believed that "Jerry's personality and the way he approached things
was very key in how the legal department evolved in the union."
He wasn't saying, "Okay here's what you must do, and here's
what you cannot do."... Jerry was saying, "What do you have to
do? Now, let me help you think about your strategy. But I'm not
gonna define, I'm not going to create your strategy for you. I'll
help think about it. But what's most important is, you do what
you have to do and let me as a lawyer figure out how you get it
done." . . . [Another] thing that I think Jerry contributed to the
union was ... instead of saying "what's legal?" [he would ask],
"What's right?" And then, "Let's do that." Or, "What's
wrong?," and whatever's wrong, "Let's fix that.
1 70
Cohen himself attributes the ease of collaboration to the self-
confidence of lead organizers such as Chavez, Govea, Padilla, Huerta and
Ganz, who did not find the law or a lawyer threatening.' 7' As Govea
concluded,
I think you need to have both, right? You need to have someone
who's confident enough in their organizational skills and in their
leadership position, to give room to the person who brings
another kind of knowledge into the thing. And then you need to
168. Ganz Interview, supra note 39. As I have noted, Chavez's trust in Cohen did not
necessarily translate to confidence in the other staff attorneys. This led Chavez to believe
that the legal department staff was basically fungible with any number of other lawyers, a
belief that Cohen strongly resisted but which contributed to the ease with which Chavez
could suggest letting the legal department go in 1978. Cohen Interview, supra note 41.
169. Govea Interview, supra note 54.
170. Id.
171. Cohen Interview, supra note 41.
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have this person who brings that other knowledge, in this case,
legal knowledge, understand that they're not the president of the
union but they have a very important role to play from their
perspective.
Finally, the UFW's legal strategy also took advantage of unique
opportunities offered by its time and place. The example of the civil rights
movement had a critically important influence on the UFW as a whole; the
movement's use of law in tandem with organizing similarly inspired Cohen
and other attorneys for the Union.'7 2 So too was the anti-war movement,
with its group of lawyers working to facilitate draft resistance and public
protest. The culture in the late 1960s and 1970s was particularly receptive
to the emergence of a new social movement and to the call to support
boycotts and protests, conveyed through legal cases as well as directly.
This is not by any means to say that being a lawyer for a farm workers
union in the late 1960s and early 1970s was an easy job, or that the legal
strategies were obvious. But once Cohen began to develop them, the field
was wide open. The convergence of the times and the legal context created
a set of opportunities that others had not recognized. The routine use of
property and criminal law to stymie pickets was low-hanging fruit, subject
to constitutional attack. A law governing farm labor organizing had not
been written. Growers did not expect, and for a number of years were
unprepared for, the high-level representation that farm workers received.
None of these aspects of the UFW's context obviate the tremendous
creativity, dedication and persistence of Cohen and his legal team. But
they will be important to keep in mind when we turn shortly to the question
of the very different-in many ways polar opposite--context in which
labor lawyers are operating today.
C. How Legal Work Is Different under a Governing Law
Once the ALRA passed, the role of the UFW's lawyers changed.
Litigation continued, but became much less central. As Cohen reflects in
retrospect, before the ALRA,
[W]e were trying to use every for[u]m we could to present, not
only to judges but to the public, what the problems were. And
172. For explorations of the grassroots level legal work that accompanied organizing in
the civil rights movement (beyond the better-known NAACP strategy), see J. L. CHESTNUT
JR. & JULIA CASS, BLACK IN SELMA: THE UNCOMMON LIFE OF J. L. CHESTNUT, JR. (1990);
Francesca Polletta, The Structural Context of Novel Rights Claims: Southern Civil Rights
Organizing, 1961-1966, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 367 (2000); Thomas Hilbink, The
Profession, the Grassroots, and the Elite: Lawyering for Civil Rights in the Direct Action
Era (unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Cause Lawyering and Social
Movements on March 4, 2005) (copy on file with journal).
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the way we saw it . . .since there was no law regulating farm
workers, we had to file . . . innovative lawsuits to raise issues.
Now, once the law passed the need for doing that passed.'73
The legal department's core mission was still to facilitate organizing
success. But how organizing success was achieved had changed. After the
ALRA, the right to represent workers could come only through victory in
an ALRA-supervised election. And under those circumstances, legal
resources went into shaping the ALRA to the Union's advantage and then
to pursuing unfair labor practices, contesting grower appeals, and fighting
to guarantee workers' the rights guaranteed them by the law. As former
legal department staff (and after Cohen's departure, briefly Legal
Department Director) Barbara Macri-Ortiz recalls, "The fierce war between
the parties continued. Only now they fought on a different turf, and the
weapons had changed: charges, counter-charges, objections, appeals and
delays were the new weapons of choice."' 74 Lawyers had to document all
the ALRA claims that the unions filed, and they had to do it quickly.
Cohen notes,
[W]e put ourselves under a tight gun. You had to file your
objections in five days, your response in five days. We're talking
400 elections, a huge amount of work. You had to have people
getting declarations. We had a lot of hearings. So you have a
huge amount of energy into defending those election victories,
which is pure legal work.'75
"Once the law [was] passed," Cohen notes, the union suddenly needed "a
full time big staff of... labor law technicians to work [the] ALRA.' 76
The UFW gained a tremendous amount through what it made of the
opportunities the ALRA offered. But it is also true that life under a
governing law created new obstacles, chief among them delay and
backlash. On the ground, growers became increasingly savvy about the
potential for postponing a final decision based on appeals under the ALRA,
counting on the ALRB's mounting backlog and the temporary nature of
farm labor to ensure that the group of workers who had voted to unionize
173. 1993 Levy Interview with Cohen, supra note 64.
174. Memoir of Barbara Macri-Ortiz (1969-1990), Documentation Project,
http://www.farnworkermovement.org (follow "Essays" link, then "Essays by Author" link,
then "Barbara Macri-Ortiz 1969-1990" link).
175. Cohen Interview, supra note 41.
176. Id. Question: "Did you ever see any evidence of law, the way you practiced it,
undermining organizing the way the UFW did it?" Cohen: "Certainly not before the law
passed, because it was legal karate, and we were hand in glove. After the law passed, it's
not that it undermines organizing, but it's that there's such a demand for people's time,
testifying dt hearings, to sit down for the declarations, piece together what happened in
terms of developing our objections and their objections.... So I wouldn't say it undermined
it, but it diverted energy." Id.
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had moved on to another ranch or another state by the time their ballots
were certified. 77 Growers reconfigured their businesses to make organiz-
ing under the ALRA more difficult, shifting out of certain crops and into
others in order to evade coverage, and changing owners and business
structures once the UFW prevailed in the hopes of not being labeled a
"successor enterprise" required to negotiate with the Union. They also
increased subcontracting, which made organizing harder despite the
ALRA's recognition of the grower, not the subcontractor, as the legally
responsible employer.
78
So long as the UFW retained its vibrancy and its capacity to mobilize
outside pressure, however, it could respond creatively to these obstacles.
After a majority of workers had voted for the UFW in an election the
Union could-and did-still use social-movement style campaigns to
convince growers to drop their appeals and begin contract negotiations, just
as it did to pressure the ALRB when it was initially ineffective in
implementing the law. As one Union volunteer (and later UFW attorney)
recalls, just after the ALRA passed, union staff heard often the mantra that
"'the [ALRA] bill gives us representations; the boycott-contracts.",
179
And with regard to the growers' battles on the political front, the UFW
could-and did-fight back.'80  For example, the union successfully
advocated to defeat most grower-sponsored legislation to amend the
ALRA, and Governor Brown vetoed every such bill that did pass.'
8'
Chavez, Cohen and others understood that the ALRA would offer
them only a brief window of opportunity before growers gained the
knowledge and political power they needed to roll back farm workers' new
rights. 82 Had the UFW continued to hold up its half of the battle, it would
still have had to fight growers on every front. The restructuring of the
industry would have continued, to the Union's disadvantage. Delays at the
177. The ALRB was hampered by insufficient funding from the very beginning, and
accumulated a large backlog of cases within its first year. By early 1977, workers faced
prospective delays of up to two years after an election for the board to certify the union as
their representative. MAJKA & MAJKA, supra note 31, at 248.
178. Wells & Villarejo, supra note 32, at 309. See also Miriam J. Wells, Legal Conflict
and Class Structure: The Independent Contractor-Employee Controversy in California
Agriculture, 21 LAW & Soc. REv. 49 (1987).
179. Memoir of Mary Mecartney (1974-1993), Documentation Project,
http://www.farmworkermovement.org (follow Essays link, then Essays by Author Link,
then Mary Mecartney 1974-1993 link).
180. MAJKA & MAJKA, supra note 31, at 270.
181. Wells & Villarejo, supra note 32, at 312.
182. They often explicitly cast this analysis in terms of the 12 years of relative freedom
that the labor movement enjoyed between the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 and Taft-
Hartley in 1947: "If we have to take the NL[R]A, let's take it with 12 years of the right to
boycott.... [W]e want what you got[,] which was 12 years of boycotting and hell-raising."
1993 Levy Interview with Cohen, supra note 64.
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ALRB would likely have persisted. And there might have been nothing
that the UFW could have done to forestall the election of a Republican
governor. But the vital UFW of the early days had faced grower opposition
and Republican administrations before, and had prevailed. Given how
many times the UFW had applied its spirit and creativity to develop
strategies to stare down defeat in the past, it seems plausible that had it
been operating at full strength it could have met these new challenges with
an effective response.'83 Had the Union continued organizing vigorously in
the early 1980s, it might have built a base of workers large enough to pull
through the hard years that followed. Had so many determined,
experienced organizers not been fired or left, they might have been able to
work with that base to generate walk-outs that could have pressured
growers to withdraw appeals and negotiate a contract to avoid watching
produce rot in the fields. Had the UFW maintained its legal department at
full strength, it might have been able to continue to use its young attorneys'
boundless energy and its low legal costs to out-litigate the opposition,
winning enough cases before the ALRB to open up some new organizing
possibilities and defend some old ones. The Union might have won
another five or ten years of strong organizing before having to retrench and
retool its strategy. We will never know for sure.
IV. LABOR LAW, LABOR LAWYERS, AND UNIONS TODAY
The labor movement's current struggles may offer some indication of
what the UFW would have confronted had it continued with its legal
department in full force through the 1980s, as growers won control of the
ALRB and succeeded in sharply reducing the agency's funding. Since
John Sweeney and his slate of reformers were elected to run the AFL-CIO
in 1995 on their promise of rejuvenating the labor movement, the
federation has taken a strong position that organizing is imperative.
Sweeney's immediate appointment of Jonathan Hiatt to the General
Counsel position was one aspect of this commitment. Hiatt's long history
of legal work with the SEIU, which under Sweeney's leadership in the
1980s and early 1990s became one of the AFL-CIO's most innovative and
aggressive unions, had primed him for this position. Hiatt and his staff
work in tandem with the legal departments of the international unions that
belong to the AFL-CIO and their locals, as well as with outside labor
lawyers and pro bono supporters. Attorneys for Change to Win Coalition
unions are similarly dedicated and creative. But given that most of the
field is occupied by a law and an agency that have become sinkholes for
unions, not a source of support, the question is: can even the best team of
183. Nathan Interview, supra note 51.
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labor lawyers do more than nibble around the edges of the problem?
It is helpful to situate this question briefly in a look at how unions
have used law over time. When Jerry Cohen was developing his approach
to the law, inspiration for a young political lawyer was much more readily
available from the civil rights movement than from labor, whose lawyers
seemed staid and "old-school" by comparison.184 But in an earlier era,
lawyers had a rich history of work within the labor movement. In the
1890s and early years of the twentieth century, attorneys were constantly
on call to fight the injunctions and criminal proceedings brought against
unions who boycotted, picketed or struck. 5  Prior to and just after the
Wagner Act's becoming law, during the time of the CIO's birth and
greatest strength, labor lawyers-the category was a new one then-played
a wide range of roles in supporting labor organizing. Lee Pressman, the
Steel Workers Organizing Committee general counsel beginning in 1936
and general counsel to the CIO from 1937 to 1948; Maurice Sugar, the
UAW's general counsel from 1939 to 1947; and others, such as Carol
Weiss King, used legal cases as a platform to publicize workers' struggles
and build solidarity among workers, helped build alliances between labor
and community groups, taught workers about their rights with the goal of
expanding their view of the right to organize, and created new legal
theories to support controversial organizing tactics such as the sit-down
strike. In addition, of course, they were instrumental in shaping the
framework of legislation, judicial rulings, and the new NLRB, all in order
to facilitate industrial unionism. 
86
184. Sandy Nathan hadn't even studied labor law in law school. "It didn't have any
attraction. I was more interested in the anti-war movement, the civil rights movement, and
politics generally. Even though I had grown up in a small PA town where the Steelworkers
were dominant, even though my dad was in a union, I didn't see Labor Law as a place I was
heading into in 1969." Nathan Interview, supra note 51. Bill Carder, by contrast, had been
an NLRB lawyer for three years after law school, from 1967-1970, before joining the
UFW's legal department. He recalls that the difference between what he saw at the NLRB
and at the UFW was "amazing." At the NLRB he handled numerous appeals for unions that
were defeated and demoralized after being beaten, and had "handed campaigns over to the
lawyers in the hope of the legal process delivering a bargaining order three years late." The
UFW, on the other hand, "had a sense of real power. They were not afraid to lose, and they
didn't quit." Carder Interview, supra note 52.
185. See sources cited supra note 61.
186. I thank Alan Hyde for drawing my attention to this tradition in labor lawyering. See
also GILBERT GALL, PURSUING JUSTICE: LEE PRESSMAN, THE NEW DEAL, AND THE CIO
(1999); CHRISTOPHER H. JOHNSON, MAURICE SUGAR: LAW, LABOR, AND THE LEFT IN
DETROIT 1912-1950 (1988). On the role of rights in generating and advancing a broad
vision of worker organizing within the labor movement in the 1920s, see James Gray Pope,
Labor's Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 1013-19 (1997). On Carol King's
work with unions in the 1930s and 40s, see ANN FAGAN GINGER, CAROL WEISS KING:
HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYER, 1895-1952 (1993); see also Arthur Kinoy's description of his own
and David Scribner's work with the labor movement during the same period. ARTHUR
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As with the UFW after the passage of the ALRA, traditional labor
lawyers in the aftermath of the NLRA began to work in much narrower
channels. Most became technicians, steeped in the rules for organizing
developed through NLRB and court decisions, skilled in shepherding a
union through NLRA elections and contract negotiations and in processing
grievances, but largely blinkered as to the broader question of what other
kinds of law and lawyering could do for unions. There were always
exceptions to the rule. Arthur Kinoy's description of his work with the
United Electric Workers in the late 1940s and the 1950s, for example, falls
squarely within the earlier law-as-a-tool-to-build-power tradition.1 87 In
union work as in other arenas in which a "people's lawyer" operates, Kinoy
notes, success was not necessarily measured by "the technical winning or
losing of the formal proceeding." "To the degree that the legal work
helped to develop a sense of strength, an ability to fight back," he argues, it
was successful independent of victory under the NLRA or other laws.
88
But by and large, labor lawyers in the second half of the twentieth century
operated as NLRA technicians or specialists. This narrowing of
perspective was graphically illustrated by the UFW's experience in the
1960s when it approached some of California's best labor lawyers for
assistance, and found them so mired in the NLRA that they told the Union
to stop carrying out its first grape boycott because it violated the NLRA's
ban on secondary activity, even though the Union was not bound by federal
labor law. 8 9
Today, the universe of lawyers working to advance workers' rights is
a broad and dynamic one. I will limit my discussion to union-side labor
lawyers. But there is another (sometimes overlapping) group of lawyers
who represent other forms of worker organizations-such as the staff
attorneys, pro-bono lawyers, and law faculty who provide representation to
worker centers. 190 Still others (again overlapping) participate in litigation
and advocacy efforts on behalf of workers around the country. There is
creative lawyering going on all over the country in support of efforts to
enact living wage laws,' 9' defend and expand farm workers' rights, 92 and
KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: THE ODYSSEY OF A PEOPLE'S LAWYER chs. 2, 3, 4, 5 (1983).
187. KINOY, supra note 186, at 51-59.
188. Id. at 57.
189. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
190. For descriptions of the worker center model see generally JANICE FINE, WORKERS
CENTERS: ORGANIZING NEW COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE DREAM (2006); GORDON,
supra note 92; MIRIAM CHING YOON LOUIE, SWEATSHOP WARRIORS: IMMIGRANT WOMEN
WORKERS TAKE ON THE GLOBAL FACTORY (2001).
191. On the living wage movement, see generally STEPHANIE LUCE, FIGHTING FOR A
LIVING WAGE (2004). On lawyers' roles within the movement, see Scott L. Cummings,
Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Toward a Grassroots Move-
mentfor Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REv. 399, 465-72 (2001); Kathleen Erskine & Judy
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enforce basic workplace protections on behalf of the lowest-wage
workers. 193
Workplace rights in this more comprehensive sense are emerging as a
productive and exciting arena for the collaboration of lawyers and
organizers, and a new field of study and inspiration for scholars.1
94
Contemporary union lawyers, however, have been all but ignored in
academic literature, presumably on the assumption that if labor law is dead
its practitioners must also be moribund. It is true that labor attorneys today
still spend a great deal of time on day-to-day union work: representing
union staff and members (or would-be members) during recognition
campaigns, supervising elections, pursuing cases before the NLRB, taking
up grievances, defending unions against members' claims of unfair or
inadequate representation, and so on. Reflecting on this work, they express
frustration with the seemingly endless and often fruitless struggle to
surmount the legal obstacles that lie in the path of any labor organizing
campaign. 95 But as I have noted, in the legal departments of the AFL-CIO
and its member unions, of Change to Win Unions, and of innovative local
efforts, labor lawyers have once again begun to grapple seriously with how
to make law relevant to the rebirth of the labor movement.
96
Marblestone, The Role of Lawyers in Santa Monica's Struggle for a Living Wage (Feb. 7,
2005) (unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Cause Lawyering and Social
Movements (March 4, 2005)) (on file with Journal).
192. Fran Ansley, Mexican Guestworkers in Carolina del Norte: Social Movement
Lawyering on Transnational Ground (unpublished paper presented at the Conference on
Cause Lawyering and Social Movements (March 4, 2005)) (on file with Journal).
193. Just one example of this confluence was the convening of Enforcing the Minimum
Wage for Working Families: A Conference on New Strategies for Communities and
Government, which held at N.Y.U. Law School in March of 2005, which attracted
organizers, workers' rights attorneys and government officials from all over the country.
Worker centers are at the forefront of many of these efforts.
194. GORDON, supra note 92; Scott L. Cummings and Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical
Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 470-73 (2001); Gordon, We
Make the Road by Walking, supra note 165; Julie Yates Rivchin, Building Power Among
Low- Wage Immigrant Workers: Some Legal Considerations for Organizing Structures and
Strategies, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 397 (2004); Julie A. Su, Making the Invisible
Visible: The Garment Industry's Dirty Laundry 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 405 (1998);
Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrant Workers and the Domestic Enforcement of International
Labor Rights, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 529 (2002).
195. This is evident in any conversation where labor lawyers gather to talk business, but
perhaps nowhere so much as in the annual meetings of the AFL-CIO's Lawyers'
Coordinating Committee.
196. The experience of first organizing "outside the law," and then being brought in
under a governing framework, is common to most unions. Some were active prior to the
passage of the NLRA and then brought under its ambit. Others were formed to represent
workers such as farm laborers excluded from NLRA coverage. Hospital workers, written
out of the NLRA, began organizing under the auspices of Retail Drug Employees Union
Local 1199 in New York in 1958, sixteen years before a 1974 amendment to the NLRA set
up rules for hospital worker organizing. LEON FINK & BRIAN GREENBERG, UPHEAVAL IN THE
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What is most interesting about this work is its move away from the
model of labor law practice that reigned for half a century-the tech-
nician's command of the NLRA and the NLRB-toward a recognition of
the reality that (despite the presence of a governing law that ostensibly
seeks to level the playing field between workers and employers) the
outcome of labor disputes is once again being argued in the court of public
opinion and settled by brute displays of power. Unions, and the attorneys
who represent them, have been strategizing to avoid the NLRA's sticky
web, seeking out pockets of space in which organizing feels possible again,
unconstrained by restrictive legal rules and the molasses-like pace of
NLRB and judicial decision-making. That the legal structure has not been
repealed, and must still be reckoned with even as unions and their lawyers
seek to avoid its grasp, adds another layer of complexity in this work.
Although there are many varieties of organizing in this new land, the
core demand they share is that the employer agree to step back from a
position of antagonism vis-A-vis the union, retreat from reliance on NLRA
rules and NLRB procedures to create delay, and simply allow the workers
to make their choice about representation. As I note in the Introduction, the
labor movement has, in the past six years, moved increasingly away from
NLRB-supervised elections and toward urging employers to recognize and
bargain with a union once a majority of workers sign cards indicating their
desire for representation, a process often called "card-check recognition." '197
Where unions do not have sufficient power to win card-check, they often
seek a "neutrality" agreement, by which the employer promises to refrain
from doing any number of things designed to sway workers away from a
vote for the union. These two types of agreements can also be combined.
It is, of course, one thing to make such requests, and quite another to
have them agreed to and respected. Unchained from the supposedly
equalizing armature of the NLRA, card-check campaigns bring into stark
relief the question of how much resistance a particular employer is
prepared to exert, and how much power a particular union has to counter
that resistance. Employers rarely sign such agreements on first request.
QUIET ZONE: A HISTORY OF HOSPITAL WORKERS' UNION, LOCAL 1199 28 (1989). Public
employees, also not covered by the NLRA, fought for many years to have their organizing
efforts covered by law, and were ultimately successful, first on the state and then on the
federal level. PAUL JOHNSTON, SUCCESS WHILE OTHERS FAIL: SOCIAL MOVEMENT
UNIONISM AND THE PUBLIC WORKPLACE (1994).
197. For a very useful overview of the card-check effort and the legal arguments
proffered against it, see Brudney, supra note 5. See also Dorothee Benz, Sisyphus and the
State: On the Front Lines of Union Organizing, DISSENT, Fall 2004, at 78, 80 (citing the
union preference for card check agreements as opposed to the NLRB process); Roger C.
Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor Neutrality
Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 372
(2001) (noting increased reliance by unions on pre-recognition neutrality agreements).
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Some do so in the context of an ongoing relationship with a particular
union or set of unions. Others require considerable pressure before they are
willing to concede. To this end, many unions today conduct "corporate" or
"comprehensive" campaigns-efforts to generate negative publicity and
negative economic consequences for corporations and their board members
and/or to work with shareholders to elect corporate boards more
sympathetic to their cause-in order to bring an employer to a point where
it is willing to accede to an agreement and abide by its terms.' 98
Called on to facilitate card-check campaigns and their comprehensive
campaign companions, lawyers have responded in a variety of ways. One
has been to litigate and legislate to permit or (ideally) mandate card-check
as a route to union recognition. Another has been to use a wide range of
legal tactics as leverage in a comprehensive campaign, to bolster union
power and batter employer resistance during the course of a card-check
effort. And a third has been to use the law as a way to build public support
for union organizing as an essential American right.
In the most common form of card-check campaign, unions pursue
private agreements with individual corporations or clusters of companies.
When card-check campaigns began to gain adherents in the labor
movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they were usually carried out
with employers whose existing workforce was already unionized. What the
union sought in those cases was a commitment that if and when the
employer expanded its operations (for example, by buying a new plant or
building a new property), it would agree in advance to recognize the union
as the representative of the new employees upon presentation of cards
signed by the majority of them. Such a campaign, launched in Las Vegas
in 1987 just as hotel owners there were poised to expand, resulted in the
90% rate of union representation that prevails today on the strip.' 99 A
198. For descriptions of comprehensive campaigns and the legal issues that they raise
from the labor perspective, see David Moberg, Labor's Capital Strategies, in NOT YOUR
FATHER'S UNION MOVEMENT 201, 203 (Jo-Ann Mort, ed., 1998); Craig Becker, "Better
Than a Strike ": Protecting New Forms of Collective Work Stoppages Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 371-75 (1994); Paul More, Protections
Against Retaliatory Employer Lawsuits After BE&K Construction v. NLRB, 25 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 205, 212-14 (2004); Nathan Newman, The Conflict of the Courts: RICO,
Labor, and Legal Preemptions in Union Comprehensive Campaigns, 51 DRAKE L. REV.
307, 309-10 (2003); Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate
Governance: Shareholder Activism By Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1032-33
(1998). For critiques from the management perspective, see Herbert R. Northrup,
Corporate Campaigns: The Perversion of the Regulatory Process, 23 J. LAB. RES. 345, 355
(1996); Herbert R. Northrup & Charles H. Steen, Union "Corporate Campaigns" as
Blackmail: The RICO Battle at Bayou Steel, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 771, 845 (1999).
199. Courtney Alexander, Rise to Power: The Recent History of the Culinary Union in
Las Vegas, in THE GRIT BENEATH THE GLITTER (Hal K. Rothman & Mike Davis eds., 2002).
An advantage of carrying the card-check process out this way is that already-unionized
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variation asks an already-unionized employer to require that its suppliers
agree to card-check recognition for their employees. 200  But this strategy
only works where an industry is growing or where manufacturers and
suppliers are tightly networked. As the popularity of the method has risen
through the 1990s and early 2000s, unions have increasingly gone beyond
these limits to seek agreements directly from non-union employers.2 1
These agreements may promise any number of a range of things,
depending on the union's strength and the employer's openness to
unionization. Many agreements require neutrality.0 2 Some of these also
(and others exclusively) promise card-check recognition. Other agreements
lay down the terms for recognition based on private elections, which are
supervised by a professional labor arbitrator; stipulated elections, which are
held under NLRB supervision but before which the parties stipulate to the
"bargaining unit" of employees entitled to vote, an issue that employers can
otherwise use to delay union recognition; 2 3 or consent elections (also
NLRB-run), through which elections are held in fourteen days rather than
the usual month after the union's filing of an election petition. In consent
elections the employer agrees to waive pre- and post-election objections
workers, rather than the more vulnerable workers the union has yet to organize, are asked to
bear the burden of demanding that the employer agree to recognize card majorities in the
future. Conversation with Dorothee Benz, Director of Communications, Communication
Workers of America Local 1180, in New York, N.Y. (July 23, 2004) [hereinafter Benz
Conversation].
200. For example, the UAW asks the Big Three auto producers to demand that parts
suppliers agree to card-check recognition for the parts suppliers' employees before the Big
Three will buy from them. Danny Hakim & Micheline Maynard, G.M Accord Finishes
Talks For U.A. W., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2003, at C1.
201. One of the largest-scale examples at the moment is a joint effort by the Teamsters
and UNITE HERE to organize the 17,000 employees of the Cintas commercial laundry
chain around the country. Uniform Justice Homepage, http://www.uniformjustice.org/.
Although card-check campaigns offer part of an answer to some of the problems that unions
face at this point in time, they are not a panacea. In particular, they carry no guarantee that
rank and file workers will have an opportunity for leadership or even participation at
decisive moments in the campaign. Like most strategies, card-check campaigns can be
carried out with a top-down or a bottom-up orientation. In the top-down approach, the
union leadership makes its deals with employers without consulting or involving its
membership. From a bottom-up perspective, by contrast, the pressure is generated by
workers and key decisions are made at the rank and file level. Benz Conversation, supra
note 199. An analysis of current card-check campaigns along these lines is, sadly, beyond
the scope of this article.
202. This may be stated in general terms or enumerated at a highly specific level of
detail. Brudney, supra note 5, at 825-26, cites Adrienne Eaton and Jill Kriesky's study of
132 agreements negotiated by twenty-three international unions. Ninety-three percent
contained a neutrality provision and 65% also guaranteed some sort of card-check
recognition. Id.
203. See NLRB, Stipulated Election Agreement, Form NLRB-652. For another example
of a stipulated election agreement, see Stipulated Election Agreement,
http://provost.cornell.edu/pdf/StipElectionAgrmt.pdf.
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and to take no appeal beyond the NLRB regional level, thus drastically
cutting down on delay.2°4 Hiatt and other union lawyers have worked with
organizers to develop model language for these agreements, and they
defend their legality when challenged on the grounds that they violate
elements of established labor law doctrine. °5 In these ways, lawyers are on
the front lines of the effort to craft a body of law that grants non-NLRB
recognition as much or more protection from employer interference and
206decertification as the NLRB election.
Where a state or locality has some authority over a group of
employers, neutrality or card-check recognition can be legislatively
imposed, and the past few years have seen a number of bills in this vein.
2 7
At the behest of community, labor, and religious groups, state and local
legislatures have begun to mandate that companies seeking to bid for state
or municipal contracts adhere to certain practices and standards in union
organizing campaigns. Most of these bills have been passed since 2000,
and almost all are currently the subject of cases pending at the U.S. District
or Circuit Court level; their ultimate success is uncertain. One strategy is
for a state or municipality to directly mandate card-check recognition for its
own employees, as California does,20 8 or for a subset of employees not
covered by the NLRA, as New York does for non-NLRA private
employees. 29 Another approach is to forbid employers who receive public
money to use it to assist or deter a union organizing campaign. New
York2 0 and California 21  have passed such laws to apply to all state
204. See NLRB, Consent Election Agreement, Form NLRB-651. On consent elections,
see Notice of Proposed Rules Governing Consent-Election Agreements, 60 Fed. Reg.
44612, 44612-44613 (July 27, 2004).
205. For an overview of the legal arguments against card check, see Brudney, supra note
5, at 844-64.
206. The question currently before the NLRB is whether a union recognized by the em-
ployer via card-check procedures has the same protection from decertification as one that
was elected through NLRB procedures. See sources cited supra note 18. Another recent
case has addressed the question of whether a union forgoes the protections included in a
neutrality agreement when it chooses to pursue an NLRB election after the employer signs
one. Serv. Employees Int'l Union v. St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 344 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2003),
cert. denied 124 S. Ct. 1878 (2004) (holding that the protections still apply).
207. This discussion draws on a telephone interview with Nancy Schiffer, Associate
General Counsel, AFL-CIO (May, 2, 2005).
208. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3507.1 (West 1995). For an overview of California's
legislation on this front, see John Logan, Innovations in State and Local Labor Legislation:
Neutrality Laws and Labor Peace Agreements in California, in 3 THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
LABOR, 2003, 157, 158-59 (Ruth Milkman ed., The Institute for Labor & Employment,
2003), available at http://repositories.cdlibrary/ile/scl2003/ch05 (describing AB1281
effective as of January 2002 which requires employer recognition of public employee
unions upon presentation of a card majority).
209. Gregory DeFreitas, Global Tension, Local Recession and Recovery Prospects: New
York's Economy One Year Later, 5 REGIONAL LAB. REV. 10 (2002).
210. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 211-a (McKinney's 2002).
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contractors; other states have similar laws that apply only to one industry,
as with Florida's statute that targets nursing homes2 2 or New Jersey's
Executive Order affecting purveyors of uniforms for state employees." 3 A
third category includes the so-called "labor peace" statutes, which set out
rules for organizing campaigns with the goal of avoiding the interruption of
state services. The city of Milwaukee, for example, has a law requiring
that companies wishing to bid with the city for contracts to transport
elderly or disabled people remain neutral during any union organizing
campaign and permit union organizers access to the workers. 4 The city of
San Jose's living wage ordinance mandates that city contractors ensure
"labor peace" by eschewing discrimination or intimidation of employees in
retaliation for union support and requires that city contractors maintain
neutrality during organizing campaigns.215
Unions often pursue these bills as a part of broad coalitions, and labor
lawyers may play only advisory roles in their conception and drafting. But
once the provisions become law, they are regularly challenged by
employers and employer associations, who argue, among other things, that
they are pre-empted by the NLRA or state law or barred by the First
Amendment. Inevitably then, labor movement lawyers become drawn into
litigation in state courts, as well as before the NLRB and in federal courts,
defending the bills that pass. As I have noted, it is as yet unclear whether
this strategy will survive legal challenge.
21 6
For example, the California "No Public Money" law was struck down
by the Ninth Circuit as pre-empted in 2004. That decision was withdrawn
in 2005 but affirmed by a panel of Ninth Circuit judges shortly thereafter.
21 7
The New York law was held by a U.S. District Court judge to be pre-
218 Mil
empted in 2005 and is on appeal to the Second Circuit. The Milwaukee
211. CAL. Gov'TCODE §§ 16645.1-16645.8 (West 1995).
212. FLA GENERAL LAWS Ch. 2002-231 (2002).
213. Ex. Order No. 20, 2002 N.J. LAWS 1218 (requiring that apparel purchased by the
state be manufactured under specified conditions, including employer neutrality toward
union organizing effects).
214. MILWAUKEE COUNTY, Wisc. GENERAL ORDINANCES § 31.02(a).
215. SAN JOSE, CAL., ORDINANCE 68554 (Nov. 18, 1998).
216. Some laws-for example, the labor peace provisions of the San Jose Living Wage
ordinance-have not been challenged in court. Most are currently awaiting decisions at the
Circuit Court level. One-Pittsburgh's Ordinance 22, requiring contractors in state-funded
hospitality projects to be party to a collective bargaining agreement with a no-strike
clause-has been decisively held not preempted. Hotel Employees and Rest. Employees
Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Res., Inc., 390 F.3d 206 (2004), cert. denied 161 L. Ed.
2d 792 (2005).
217. Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 364 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (opinion
withdrawn and rehearing granted by Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 408 F.3d 590
(2005)); aff'd on rehearing by Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 422 F.3d 973 (2005).
218. Healthcare Ass'n of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Pataki, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
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law was upheld by a U.S. District Court judge against a preemption attack
in early 2005; the appeal is pending before the Seventh Circuit.
219
Some of the most creative legal work today-and that with the
greatest parallels to the UFW in its "law of the jungle" days-is being done
by lawyers working on comprehensive campaigns. On the theory that
employers who violate labor law are likely to be violating other laws as
well, lawyers work with organizers and researchers to identify areas where
the corporation in question is breaking consumer, zoning, environmental,
wage and hour, OSHA and other laws. The lawyers then bring suit or
initiate administrative proceedings, both as a way to gain redress for the
workers and as leverage against the business. In the context of compre-
hensive campaigns, lawsuits and public exposds about wage and hour
violations, environmental hazards, and dangerous working conditions
generate negative publicity that becomes an embarrassment to a company
and serves as a goad to sign a recognition agreement.22 ° In addition to the
role wage suits play in comprehensive campaigns, a few unions, such as
SEIU, have dedicated substantial amounts of legal resources to litigation
about wage and hour violations on behalf of non-union workers, with the
goal of raising the wage floor in an industry and thus decreasing the
disadvantage that unionized contractors face when they face non-union
competitors.221 Such lawsuits also serve as a way for the union to
demonstrate to workers its commitment to their well-being and its capacity
to deliver concrete benefits. 2  For example, when SEIU offered home
health care workers in California the chance to participate in a lawsuit
under the Fair Labor Standards Act for underpayment of wages during the
course of the union's organizing campaign, over 30,000 workers "opted in"
to the lawsuit, gaining what for many was a first experience with represent-
tation of any sort in the workplace.223
Comprehensive campaign strategies take unions and their lawyers
further out on a limb than many have become used to going. 2 ' The
219. Metropolitan Milwaukee Ass'n of Commerce v. Milwaukee County, 325 F.3d 879
(7th Cir. 2005).
220. See sources cited supra note 196.
221. See Steven Greenhouse, Among Janitors, Labor Violations Go with the Job, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 2005, at Al; Nation's Largest Janitors' Union Leading Effort to Police
Unscrupulous Practices: Workers Force Corporations to Pay Millions in Lost Wages as
Lawsuits Over Unlawful Employment Practices Spread, PR NEwswiRE, Jan. 24, 2005. For
further exploration of union litigation to enforce basic workplace rights, see generally
Catherine Fisk, Union Lawyers and Employment Law, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. LAW 57,
59 (2002); Michael J. Hayes, Let Unions Be Unions: Allowing Grants of Benefits During
Representation Campaigns, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 259, 283 (2003).
222. For a discussion of the ethical questions related to such lawsuits, see Fisk, supra
note 221.
223. Telephone Interview with Jon Hiatt, General Counsel, AFL-CIO (Feb. 22, 2005).
224. My thanks to Nathan Newman for his thoughts on the legal risks of comprehensive
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negative publicity that a union generates against a corporation in the course
of such a campaign may become the basis for a defamation lawsuit or a
tortious interference with business claim. The threat to move union
pension funds out of an investment in a particular corporation might run
afoul of ERISA on the grounds that it demonstrates a failure of the duty to
maximize shareholder profits.225 RICO has increasingly been used against
unions carrying out comprehensive campaigns on the accusation that
labor's alliances with consumers and shareholders constitute blackmail and
should subject the union to criminal prosecution.226 Although these risks are
high, unions are nonetheless willing to take them because they are
desperate to escape from the NLRA's straightjacket.227
A final strategy to which labor lawyers in this group contribute is
public education in order to bring the lack of a real right to organize alive
for politicians, religious, community leaders, and the public. Formally,
labor lawyers have worked with organizers to construct parallel institutions
that simultaneously publicize workers' grievances against their employers
and unions' grievances against the NLRB. The Workers Rights Boards
that the labor-affiliated group Jobs with Justice has created around the
country are the most prominent example. Such Boards are made up of
community, religious and labor leaders and are convened in cases where
the NLRB has not addressed the violations of an employee's rights or lacks
the power to do so, or where pervasive delays at the NLRB would prevent
campaigns. Lawyers working on comprehensive campaigns may also be accused of using
lawsuits instrumentally, as a pressure tactic. Yet, however fervent the opposition to such an
approach may be on political grounds, so long as the underlying legal claim is not frivolous
or brought merely to harass the opponent, it does not violate any ethical rules. Indeed, the
practice of using lawsuits as leverage is commonplace among corporate attorneys who may,
for example, bring a range of suits against a company seeking to acquire another business in
order to pressure it into dropping the takeover attempt. See Michael Rosenzweig, Target
Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 110, 114 (1986) (citing study of ninety-five hostile bids where
63% elicited target lawsuits as a tactic to resist the takeover).
225. There is an intuitive argument to be made that since union members are the
shareholders, it is in their ultimate interest to bring new blood into the labor movement,
which requires organizing. However, ERISA explicitly requires that pension funds be
managed to further the interests of union members as investors rather than as workers.
Newman, supra note 198, at 341.
226. For discussion of this problem from the union prospective see Newman and
Northrup & Steen, supra note 198; Victoria G.T. Bassetti, Weeding RICO Out of Garden
Variety Labor Disputes, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 103, 122 (1992).
227. Cohen and other former UFW attorneys often reflect on what they gained through
the feeling of having "nothing to lose." For example, Sandy Nathan remembers his
eagerness to apply the lessons he had learned from the UFW in his first post-UFW job with
a labor law firm in 1980. His first assignment was to represent a construction union seeking
a $5 per hour raise in negotiations over its contract. (Six years before, his first negotiation
for the UFW had sought to raise by ten cents a $2.40 per-hour wage). He quickly realized
that his radical ideas were inappropriate; the construction union "had too much to lose."
Nathan Interview, supra note 51.
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justice from being done. In public meetings the Boards hear testimony
from workers and others and then issue a report with their findings, which
is used to further publicize the workers plight. These findings, sometimes
couched as "opinions," gain further weight from the presence on the
Boards of former NLRB members such as Sarah Fox and former NLRB
General Counsel Fred Feinstein.
In a similar vein, labor lawyers have also done extensive work with
the media, authored academic reports, and played key roles in efforts to
place violations of workers rights to organize within an international
human rights framework. Among the latter, Human Rights Watch's reports
denouncing the lack of protection for worker organizing in the United
States as a violation of basic human rights principles has been particularly
powerful.228 Much of this work feeds into the AFL-CIO's Voice@Work
initiative, an effort to create broad recognition of the importance of the
right to organize and of its erosion in the United States.2 29 Voice@Work
reflects the fact that law is not the only (and often not the most powerful)
force in configuring employer behavior--culture is critically important. As
Hiatt is fond of noting, the "permanent replacement doctrine," a rule that
permits employers to hire permanent workers to replace their employees
who have gone on strike to protest wages or working conditions, was
announced by the Supreme Court in 1938 but languished nearly unused
until President Reagan fired striking members of the Professional Air-
Traffic Controllers Association (PATCO) in 1981. Since that culture-
shifting event, without any concurrent change in law, permanent replace-
ment of strikers has become a routine occurrence. Recognizing that mean-
ingful change in the law is unlikely at this point, Voice@Work seeks to
enact that process in reverse, by re-stigmatizing employer infringement on
the right to organize.
In all of these ways, union lawyers over the past ten years have sought
to avoid entanglement with current labor law. It might seem ironic, then,
that the AFL-CIO is currently seeking major labor law reform that would,
among other things, embed the right to card-check recognition within the
NLRA framework and bring unions back into the NLRB's orbit. In 2003
Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) and Representative George Miller (D-CA)
introduced the "Employee Free Choice Act" into Congress; it has been re-
introduced each session since then.230  The AFL-CIO, which strongly
228. LANCE COMPA, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE
UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS (Human Rights Watch,
2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/u/us/uslbroo8.pdf; LANCE COMPA,
BLOOD, SWEAT AND FEAR: WORKERS' RIGHTS IN U.S. MEAT AND POULTRY PLANTS (Human
Rights Watch, 2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2O05/usaO105/usa0105.pdf.
229. AFL-CIO, Voice@Work Website, http://www.aflcio.org/joinaunion/voiceatwork/.
230. Employee Free Choice Act, S. 842, H.R. 1696, 109th Cong. § 1 (2005).
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supports the bill, argues that its passage is critical to remove "the
debilitating obstacles employers now use to block their [workers'] free
choice., 231 The Act would respond to major union critiques of the NLRA
by requiring employers to recognize a union without an election where a
majority of the employees have signed authorization cards indicating their
desire to be represented by the union, establishing a process of mandatory
mediation and arbitration where union and employer are not able to reach
agreement on a first contract, and imposing stronger penalties on employers
who violate the National Labor Relations Act during a union organizing
campaign or first contract negotiation. Although there seems to be very
little likelihood that the bill will pass in the current political atmosphere, it
has garnered a surprising amount of support, and has become-as the AFL-
CIO hoped it would be-a spur to the discussion of the need for change.
The Employee Free Choice Act ("EFCA") offers us one last oppor-
tunity to consider what state sanction of the organizing process offers and
what it takes away; and to reflect on why an organizing effort might pursue
new legislation even as it struggles to disentangle itself from the grip of the
law on the books.
A legal right offers a movement a leg up, but no promise that it will
make it over the fence. By creating mechanisms that enshrine organizing
rights in law, and by bringing the clout of the state to bear on their
enforcement, a union puts itself in a better position than if it had to re-
establish that right in each campaign through its own exercise of power.
The temptation, of course, is to forget that in the absence of a state truly
committed to economic justice, the law can only grant a movement a
fraction more power than it is able to demonstrate on its own. The right to
board-administered card-check recognition would not be a substitute for the
need for unions to organize aggressively and creatively in order to build
power.
The benefit of current (i.e., "voluntary" rather than legally mandated)
card-check agreements lies not only in the fact that they avoid the problems
with NLRB-supervised elections, but in that they require a union and an
employer to hash out certain things about power before bargaining begins.
Political scientist Dorothee Benz points out that when a union begins its
campaign by seeking to win an agreement from an employer, it confronts
the need to marshal and exercise power from the very beginning. 232 If it
succeeds, it has in essence already won the employer's assent to the
bargaining process later down the line. Almost no employers who have
231. Laureen Lazarovivi, Union Members Mobilize to Build Support in Congress for
Workers' Freedom to Form Unions, http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/
publications/magazine/0604_laborlaw.cfm.
232. Dorothee Benz, Scaling the Wall of Employer Resistance The Case for Card Check
Campaigns, NEW LAB. F., FaIl/Winter 1998, at 120.
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initially signed agreements wage an all-out fight at the time of negotiating
the first contract.233 As Benz bluntly states, "Card check strategies are thus
rooted in the understanding that employers are brought to the table when
they are brought to their knees, and not when a court orders them there. 23 a
The same issue arises in a context of legislatively-mandated card-check
recognition. If employers were required to recognize a card majority, as
with the Employee Free Choice Act, their opposition would not
automatically dissipate. It would just be channeled differently. The day of
reckoning would be further delayed by EFCA's requirement that the first
contract be arbitrated if the parties can't reach agreement, but could never
be fully avoided. And NLRB control of the process would introduce new
opportunities for delay. At the same time, few unions would turn down the
opportunity to have card-check recognition legally guaranteed, at the very
least because it would offer a new source of leverage in the effort to build
and exercise collective power in the workplace.
V. LABOR LAW AND LABOR LAWYERING
It is easy to forget, in these times of struggle for workers, that we are
experiencing another remarkable moment. The fight for change at work is
vibrant, varied, and widespread, if often an uphill battle (and when have
things been otherwise?). Over the past decade, there has been a resurgence
of interest among law students and lawyers in working to advance
organizing efforts. New lawyers have begun to understand that the union
movement and worker organizing more broadly is a place where their
skills-deployed creatively and with respect--can offer important tools at
key moments. The result is a range of collaborations that are simulta-
neously advancing battles on the ground and helping to build a richer
theoretical understanding of how law can bolster organizing for social
change.
Much of this exciting work has taken place outside of the confines of
the NLRA. Yet there is no cause to romanticize what it is like to try to
build a union in the absence of a law that guarantees a right to organize. To
win stable contracts without legal protections for organizing is a difficult
proposition. Any temptation to return to so-called "lawless" days should
be quickly snuffed out by a reminder of the reality of the relentless years of
anti-labor injunctions when unions were thrown upon the mercy of
conservative courts around the turn of the last century, or indeed by a
review of what the UFW suffered on the road to achieving its goals, the
violence and the turmoil wrought by Teamster raids and grower tactics.
233. Brudney, supra note 5, at 831.
234. Benz, supra note 231, at 126.
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Two sociologists who have devoted much of their careers to studying farm
labor organizing conclude that in retrospect, despite the considerable
drawbacks, "a farm labor law probably offered the best hope of facilitating
long-term change in agricultural labor relations. '235 And for all that Jon
Hiatt spends his days fighting to get unions out of the swamp of the NLRA,
he still gives a resounding "no" to the question of whether labor would be
better off without a governing law.236
The UFW's experience and that of the labor movement as a whole
suggests that unions are likely to experience a cycle with regard to a
governing law that they have sought and won. The law opens up new
opportunities for organizing. It promises to bring the power of the state to
bear to permit collective bargaining where workers desire it; it offers
unions new resources to constrain employer resistance and a new rhetoric
of government support for organizing. The law does not work
automatically, but strong and creative unions can hold the state to some or
all of its guarantees. The question is, for how long? For as soon as the law
passes, to the extent that the employers it targets are strongly opposed to
unionization and find the law an impediment to their battle against it, they
will launch an attack on the agency administering the law, the politicians
perceived as supporting it, and aspects of the law itself.237 As will be news
to no student of history, administrative processes introduce administrative
delay, and backlash is inevitable. In addition to the obvious route of repeal
or amendment, there are many other ways for powerful opponents to
invalidate a law: identifying and exploiting loopholes in the legislation;
gaining political control of appointments to the agency in charge of rule-
making, implementation, and enforcement; using the legislative process to
reduce the agency's funding; supporting the selection of conservative
judges who will interpret the law in ways that curtail its reach; re-
configuring business structures to avoid the law's confines; or, most
235. Majka & Majka, Decline of the Farm Labor Movement, supra note 143, at 15.
236. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Hiatt, General Counsel, AFL-CIO (Aug. 25,
2004).
237. This is one illustration of a central point of public choice theory. For an early
classic public choice formulation of the pervasive problem of agency capture see Richard E.
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975);
for a more recent application of public choice theory see JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS,
& GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997). Although it is
beyond the scope of this article to explore the public choice implications of the interactions
between the UFW, the agricultural industry lobby in California, and the ALRB, other
scholars have sought to apply public choice theory to social movement contexts. JACK L.
WALKER, JR., MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA: PATRONS, PROFESSIONS AND
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (1991); Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Move-
ment Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 24-25, 82-83 (2001); David
B. Spence, Paradox Lost: Logic, Morality, and the Foundations of Environmental Law in
the 21st Century, 20 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 145 (1995).
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simply, flaunting the law outright and trusting that bureaucratic delay and
minimal penalties will bring reward.238
Once this attack makes some headway, the law becomes less useful to
the unions that once wished for it and won it. It becomes clearer that the
same power battle continues on the new front as well as the old one.
Eventually, if amendment of the law seems impossible and the union is to
survive, it will move toward organizing strategies that circumvent the law
and legal tactics that seek both to protect the flank of those strategies and to
make their own contribution to power-building. As those new union
strategies and tactics gain traction, however, their ad-hoc nature and
vulnerability to employer attack become increasingly frustrating. Once
again, the labor movement looks to enshrine its organizing approach in a
state-administered legal framework.
If the push-pull of law felt by today's unions is inevitable, what
lessons are to be learned from it?
First, seeking the aid of the state is always a double-edged sword, not
only dangerous or only helpful but both simultaneously. The passage of a
new law creates new obstacles and new opportunities for players already
engaged in an ongoing game. By reconfiguring the rules it gives the
advantage to one side or the other. The question then is, what is the law
good for? And what do the players make of the new rules? As the story of
the UFW and the ALRA illustrates, even the best labor law does not do its
work alone. It requires a union partner that is organizing actively, is
configured in a way that makes sense in light of the structure of work in the
industry, and is responsive to the particular needs of the workers who are or
will be its members. The danger lies in the temptation for a movement to
wed its fate to a legal framework that makes government the arbiter of
organizing. Given the inevitability of delay and backlash, a movement that
does this is likely, in the words of Jerry Cohen, to wake up and find "an
administrative ... albatross around [its] neck.,
23 9
That a danger exists, though, is not a guarantee that a movement will
fall prey to it. The transition from law as soaring eagle to law as albatross
is not itself inevitable, even if it is likely. Where employers are constrained
in their capacity to fight the law-or are indifferent to it-it may remain a
useful tool for decades, as have the laws authorizing the unionization of
public employees. In contrast with the minimal and sinking rate of private-
sector union density, the level of public employee unionization-which
238. Public choice theory has focused on the vulnerability of agencies, legislatures, and
courts to capture. Several of the other tactics in this list, however, highlight ways that
powerful opponents of a piece of legislation can reconfigure their firms' behavior or
restructure their enterprises to put themselves beyond the scope of coverage, independent of
their ability to influence state action.
239. Cohen Interview, supra note 41.
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swiftly reached over 40% once movements to launch state and federal
workers' unions took off in the 1960s and 1970s and has only fallen
slightly since then 4 -- is an important reminder of the role of context.
In the more ordinary circumstance where the cycle of law from
opportunity to obstacle seems probable, the union may still have the ability
to postpone the inevitable. Employer resistance does not rob a movement
of its agency or its capacity to continue to work in innovative and strategic
ways in the face of new challenges. The UFW's experience with Governor
Jerry Brown immediately before and after the passage of the ALRA
demonstrates that an avowedly pro-labor political regime offers no pass on
this need to maintain an independent stance vis-A-vis the state. As Cohen
later reflected, "Farm workers' history with laws are that they are on the
books and they don't get enforced.., and the trick was to let people know.
• .this was one law that ... was going to be enforced. 2 41 Whatever its
hopes for a Brown administration in the abstract, the UFW quickly saw that
the rules set out in the ALRA would only become reality if the union
compelled Brown to make them so. Cohen again: "the Democratic
administration wouldn't have enforced the law without pressure, and we
gave 'em pressure .... It was a war until Brown understood we were damn
serious about it."'242 This is, of course, all the truer (if also all the more
difficult) when faced with politicians who are open in their dislike for
243unions.
A union that does not rely on the state-run framework as a substitute
for power, but instead uses it to bolster its organizing even as it maintains
its capacity to bring pressure to bear outside the framework-much as the
240. See Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership, Coverage,
Density and Employment Among Public Sector Workers, 1973-2004,
http://www.trinityedulbhirsch/unionstats (follow "All Public Sector Workers" link, which
appears under "Historical Tables: Union Membership, Coverage, Density, and
Employment, 1973-2004") (compiling data from the Current Population Study). Some
attribute this surge to the promulgation of laws permitting the unionization of state and
federal employees during the same time period. But see JOHNSTON, supra note 195, at 26
(arguing that the laws were as much a product of public sector workers' movements as a
source of them).
241. Cohen Interview, supra note 41.
242. 1993 Levy Interview with Cohen, supra note 64.
243. When UFW staff in the 1980s blamed the ALRB appointed by Governor
Deukmejian for the union's organizing struggles, and turned toward a direct-mail boycott
appeal to foster support for organizing, some who had been fired or left the union responded
that they "shouldn't have let Deuk get away with it." 1993 Levy Interview with Cohen,
supra note 64. In an op-ed published in the Los Angeles Times in 1986, Cohen harkened
back to the early years when "the forces arrayed against the UFW were formidable: the
growers, the Teamsters and a host of government officials. Yet the union prevailed."
Chiding that "junk mail does not organize people; people organize people," he argued that
what won the UFW its triumphs of the 1960s and 1970s was "not only the boycott but the
picket line, the strike, and the aggressive use of the courts." Cohen, supra note 27.
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UFW did in the first years after the passage of the ALRA-is at least in the
short term in a stronger position with the law than without it. And in the
face of the temptation to return to the so-called law of the jungle, we would
also do well to keep in mind that the absence of a governing law does not
guarantee a fertile field for union organizing. Far from it. It just creates a
different sort of battlefield on which the same forces war.
Second, we may need to re-configure our understanding of
"successful" legislation in relationship to organizing.244 The world-and
particularly the world of work-is a fast-changing place, even as employ-
ers' desire to get more from their workers and to pay less remains a
constant. Rather than looking for a law that will offer a permanent fix to
the problems that unions face, an idea for which there is no better refutation
than the ossified NLRA, perhaps it makes more sense to approach law-
making as an act of creating "windows of opportunity," as the UFW
lawyers put it, windows that will shut (as windows do) but that can be used
as periods in which to consolidate power and build a strong base for the
next onslaught. Effective legislation and state intervention shift power but
they do not eliminate it from the equation. A union that sees a law as more
than just a leg up, a modicum of help, will be blindsided by the recurring
need to address employers' power head-on.
On the subject of good laws, the ALRA's farm-labor-friendly
provisions, and the UFW's success in organizing under them during the
time when the union was highly mobilized, speak to the need to think in
terms of multiple forms of labor law that can accommodate and facilitate
organizing in very different industries.245 The NLRA was written at a time
when the bulk of union organizing was taking place in an industrial setting
characterized by large firms that employed their workers directly, full time,
and for many years. 46  With a few notable exceptions for aspects of
construction and garment work, its provisions reflect a monolithic view of
the workplace and of the organizing process, one best suited to that
predominant context. Now, service work-health care, retail, building
cleaning-has overtaken factories as the mainstay of the economy and, by
necessity, as the primary target for union organizing. This work tends to
take place at smaller firms. Employment is structured in far more varied
ways now as well; many more jobs are subcontracted, part-time or
temporary.
244. Cf Ballam, supra note 3, at 477 ("In order for a reform to be successful, must it be
successful forever?").
245. On the importance of the provisions in the ALRA specifically tailored to the nature
of farm work see Ontiveros, supra note 120, at 175.
246. "The bulk" is not to say all. Unions have made retail workers a target since at least
the 1940s, and construction workers and other service employees have also been mainstays
of the labor movement.
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Unions have long shaped their organizing strategies around industry
characteristics.247 But current efforts for reform do not reflect the specific
needs of workers for different rules governing organizing in different
industries: labor laws rather than labor law. What about a law that created
a mechanism for multi-employer bargaining where an industry was
characterized by a number of small employers in close competition with
each other, or guaranteed the right to call secondary consumer boycotts in
heavily subcontracted industries? The UFW's experience under the ALRA
suggests that such proposals, if successful, would be very useful to unions
seeking to organize workers whose jobs do not fit the old industrial mold.
Third, there is a broad and changing range of possibilities for what
lawyers can offer union organizing. Both the UFW story and that of the
labor movement more broadly illustrate that if there is only one way to
describe what good "lawyers for organizing" do-put law in the service of
building the movement's power-there are many, many ways that such a
goal can be realized. There are cycles here too, with bursts of creativity
both during the "law of the jungle" periods where the legal landscape is up
for grabs and during the "albatross" periods when unions seek to escape the
clutches of the law, interspersed with periods of steadier development and
exercise of technical expertise while a governing law is in effect and more
or less effective.
247. A few examples among many include construction and longshore unions, operating
through union-run hiring halls, and entertainment industry unions in which workers
maintain steady membership as they move from job to job. On the organizing strategies of
longshore workers, see CHARLES P. LARROWE, SHAPE-UP AND HIRING HALL: A COMPARISON
OF HIRING METHODS AND LABOR RELATIONS ON THE NEW YORK AND SEATTLE
WATERFRONTS (1995); BRUCE NELSON, WORKERS ON THE WATERFRONT (1988); DAVID
WELLMAN, THE UNION MAKES US STRONG: RADICAL UNIONISM ON THE SAN FRANSISCO
WATERFRONT. On the entertainment industry, see UNDER THE STARS: ESSAYS ON LABOR
RELATIONS IN ARTS AND ENTERTAINMENT (Lois S. Gray & Ronald L. Seeber eds., 1996)
(analyzing unions' responses to technological advances in entertainment industry); STONE,
supra note 7, at 220-24 (2004) (analyzing different approaches taken by NABET and
IATSE in response to changes in the structure of the entertainment industry). But many
unions are hampered by current law in their quest to develop forms of organizing that reflect
and respond to the labor market and structure of the industry in which they work. For just
one example, see Dorothy Sue Cobble's discussion of how what she terms "occupational
unionism," prevalent among waitress unions in the middle of the century, offers one
promising model for organizing today, and yet how many aspects of the approach are
blocked by Taft-Hartley. Dorothy Sue Cobble, Organizing the Postindustrial Workforce:
Lessons from the History of Waitress Unionism, 44 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 419 (1991). The
Taft-Hartley ban on secondary pressure is a particular obstacle in industries where
employment is subcontracted, such as janitorial work. See Estlund, supra note 3, at 1605-
08 ("[T]he law's ban on secondary boycotts constrains the means by which unions can put
pressure on legally "neutral" employers..."); STONE, supra note 7, at 209-12 (explaining the
detrimental effects on unions of the prohibition of secondary boycotts).
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The story of the UFW reminds us that law and creative legal strategies
can make extremely helpful contributions to building a movement, but that
there is no such thing as a static relationship between the two. Organizing
to win new laws is followed by organizing to make their promises real.
Even where such a cycle is ongoing, passing a new law is no guarantee of a
move forward in some inexorable march toward a better world. A law that
makes sense in one moment of a movement's history may become an
impediment to social change at a later stage. Or the movement may change
in a way that renders it unable to take advantage of the law and vulnerable
to attack through the very rules and structures it once championed.
Understood in this way, though, the tools that good labor legislation
and good labor lawyers offer unions can be powerful indeed. These tools
are less like a jack-hammer, more like a pick, moving the process of
change-making incrementally along much as the ice-climber stakes out a
hold to pull herself up to the next ledge. Falls are inevitable. It is not
always clear which way is up. Lawyers and unions need to remain
constantly alert to the balance between technical lawyering within the
governing framework and opportunities to bring pressure to bear by using
other sorts of laws or legal tactics. There is no one point at which victory is
declared and the climb is over. As the Talmud says, "Look ahead: You are
not expected to complete the task, but neither are you permitted to set it
down."
